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Climate change has emerged as one of the leading public policy issues of recent 
times, both on domestic and international agendas. Scientific evidence has led to a 
general acceptance that the burning of fossil fuels, as well as other human activities 
that release greenhouse gases (GHGs), have attributed to higher concentrations of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere and, as a result, rising global surface 
temperatures.
1
 Increased atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have caused erratic 
temperatures, rising sea levels, precipitation changes, and reversal of ocean currents 
that are expected to have drastic effects on the overall ecosystems of our planet. As a 
result, negatively effecting our well-being as inhabitants, a situation that is only to 
magnify for future generations (Goulder and Pizer; 2006, 1). The question for public 
policy-makers is how can these threats be ameliorated under the context of the current 
international system?  
 
Although the 2011 Durban Climate Change Conference has been labeled a relatively 
unproductive affair, consensus on the direction of future global environmental 
governance has been established. Climate change mitigation will be organized around 
global production with value tied up in emissions reductions (Bernstein et al.; 2010, 
163). Regrettably, the international community as a whole has failed to effectively 
execute any climate mitigation treaty, as there remains a great deal of disagreement 
on which policies should be pursued. However, middle ground has been found 
between nations in that climate change policy will rely on a market system as the 
primary mechanism towards the long-term goal of reducing global GHG emissions. 
Included in this approach are the options of carbon taxes, emissions trading and 
programs that promote technological advances, as well as performance standards. All 
respecting the fact that any approach must be flexible and accommodating to each 
nation because any other climate change initiative that severely infringes on a state‟s 
economic sovereignty will not gain political prowess at international negotiating 
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 There is much debate on the degree to which these changes are human-induced, however that debate 
is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper recognizes that most climate change scientists support the 
belief that climate change is in fact human-induced (see “Understanding and Responding to Climate 
Change", United States National Academy of Sciences, 2008). This paper digresses from this debate 
and instead provides an analysis on the incidence of climate change from a public policy lens rather 
than a scientific one and explores the circumstances surrounding climate change mitigation from 












tables (Haas; 2008, 1-2). 
 
This research accepts that the current market-led approach to climate control, 
specifically carbon cap and trade, is the most practical mechanism to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, but takes a critical stance towards the amount of 
responsibility the free-market is allocated. Though a market-led approach will give 
global production the incentive to reduce carbon emissions, there still needs to be an 
appropriate amount of public governance incorporated into the system for incentives 
to be properly monitored in order to avoid goal-displacement.  Therefore, 
international institutions need to take a more active role in the governance of climate 
change, not allowing market forces to overtake the initial objective of emissions 
reductions. 
 
Problem/Research Question  
 
Climate change mitigation is an extremely complex issue considering the number of 
variables involved. International consensus exists in that any route towards re-writing 
past wrongs in environmental governance must include a mechanism for internalizing 
the social costs of emissions by the major polluters - mainly energy intensive 
industries and utilities companies, providing heightened financial motivation to adopt 
cleaner modes of production.  It is widely agreed upon that to do so value must be 
attached to emissions reductions, and with the Kyoto Protocol one such mechanism 
has been established. At the forefront of Kyoto is an economic quantity instrument 
known in the carbon markets as „cap and trade‟. Cap and trade allocates a certain 
amount of emissions per annum to be released into the atmosphere from individual 
states and specific industries within those states.  The system allows for emissions to 
be traded between private actors as well as accumulated by offsetting emissions 
elsewhere. The most recognized functions of emissions offsetting are the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). Within the realm of carbon trading and offsetting there are also 
the voluntary emissions reduction markets and tentative markets emerging in 













Despite the institutional growth of the Kyoto regime there are many claiming that 
carbon trading, for a number of reasons, is not a practical environmental governance 
policy, and that the system should be replaced with other means for climate change 
mitigation such as carbon taxes or unilateral state-led initiatives. The central question 
in this research paper asks whether these claims are accurate. Are carbon trading and 
emissions offsetting feasible in the context of international environmental 





In my qualitative analysis of carbon trading I will examine its original design and 
make note of the key economic and political flaws. It should be stressed that this 
paper focuses on the political dynamics of climate change, and not the science of 
climate change, identifying reforms that may elicit a possible consensus for 
cooperation in climate change governance. My analysis is based on the contention 
that the brand of carbon trading that emerged with the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol is intrinsically flawed, whereby the major hindrance for success in the new 
found climate regime is in overestimating the abilities of the free-market. This is due 
to the scope of manipulation that can occur when trading factitious commodities, such 
as carbon emissions.  Additionally, I will illustrate that cap and trade can be a 
successful venture if the marriage between politics and economics is respected to a 
larger extent than the framers of Kyoto had deemed necessary. Political 
considerations, mostly involving the participation of the developing world in 
exercises of climate change mitigation, must be carefully observed if cap and trade is 
to achieve international compliance. Here I look at the linkages between resource 
security, climate change, and development as benchmarks for designing climate 
change policy at an international level.   
 
Furthermore, I will look at the current system of cap and trade and describe its many 
weaknesses, illustrating that the problem is not in the overall system, but in how it has 
been implemented, providing the necessary results-driven „fine tuning‟ that is 












international governance structures dedicated to its success, something that was 
widely left out of the initial Kyoto framework and can, to a large extent, be attributed 
to the lack of success in the system. As a result of this void in public governance 
structures, the system was left to the free-market for self-regulation.  
 
As a point of departure for my analysis of the politics of climate change, I include the 
different theoretical standpoints that have been traditionally applied to environmental 
governance.  Here, I point out a major discrepancy in the scholarship that has 
previously relied on regime theory as an explanatory tool, but appears to fall short in 
fully grasping non-cooperation in international environmental governance. Regime 
theory, accompanied by International Political Economy (IPE) scholarship, can be 
used to explain fault-lines in international environmental governance, as well as to 
provide policy-makers with the knowledge on how to avoid this non-cooperation. 
This is pertinent to the design of a workable carbon trading scheme that must reflect 
concerns of the North-South divide in the responsibility of climate change mitigation, 
as well as the conflicting interests of resource producers and non-producers. In my 
argument that the cap and trade system is broken but fixable, with particular attention 
to the Clean Development Mechanism CDM, I will use the theoretical work of Karl 
Polyani (1944).  Polyani‟s „double movement‟ illustrates the tendency for large 
institutions to pursue accumulation when there is not a coordinating body (or reliable 
market forces) that institutes legitimacy into the system. The accumulation vs. 
legitimacy problem, prevalent in the carbon markets, has occurred due to a lack of 
regulation in the system. Here, based on Polyani's work, I will explain the situation of 
the inability of fictitious commodities to produce a favorable outcome when thrown 





The research paper will include an in-depth analysis of the literature on the subject. 
The literature in question derives from the fields of international relations and 
economics, and the sub-fields of environmental economics and environmental policy.  












Kyoto Protocol commitment periods having been renewed for 5 years in South Africa 
this past December, special attention is being paid to update academic publications 
which reflect the evolving opinions from international organizations, as well as 
individual state announcements and non-state actors on the future of climate 
governance.  
 
Literature review  
 
In the discourse of climate change politics regime theory, or neo-liberal 
institutionalism, has prevailed as the primary theoretical standpoint. David Newell 
(2000) argues that although regime theory is a workable starting point to study 
climate change, it fails to recognize some of the most important actors in climate 
change negotiations. Newell makes use of work by Susan Strange (1983) to point out 
the state-centric nature of regime theory as incomplete in explaining the power 
structures that are involved in climate change negotiations, because regime theory 
lacks „vision of a wider reality‟.
2
 Newell‟s „regime breakdown approach‟, in addition 
to the central tenets of neo-liberal institutionalism, incorporates agenda setting, 
negotiation bargaining, and implementation influences of non-state actors; media, 
scientific communities, industrial lobbyists and non-governmental organizations 
(NGO). Newell opts for a more suitable approach than regime theory termed „political 
economy of transnationalism’, which he commends on its ability to recognize the 
influence of non-state actors because of the ‘sensitivity to a state‟s location in the 
circuits of power and networks of interdependency that bind it to a multitude of actors 
and institutions that significantly shape its field of operation‟ (Newell; 2000, 166). 
 
Drawing from a similar approach to Newell, David Helm (2008) identifies the current 
environmental policy architecture as no more than a building block for the future; a 
meaningful forum for negotiations between states, NGOs, industry and climate 
change scientists in the pursuit of progressive policies. Progressive environmental 
policies include policy a framework direction that continually increases the degree of 
positive environmental impacts (or reduced negative impacts) by inflicting the least 
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 Similar arguments will be found in Betsill and Bulkeley; 2004, 2006,  Okereke et al.; 2009, and 












amounts of economic harm, as a long term goal. However, Held holds a great deal of 
contention that Kyoto will not produce beneficial results in the near future, insisting 
that the future for environmental governance is „grim‟ due to our increasing thirst for 
oil, as well as the projected population growth over the next 50 years. Helm holds a 
central argument that significant increases in emissions will persist if the 
responsibility for emissions reductions is not properly adjusted to target consumers 
rather than producers, as is intended under the current pathway. The longer 
environmental policy fails to acknowledge this fundamental accounting flaw, the 
more difficult future corrections will be. However, despite Helm‟s convincing 
rhetoric, he fails to provide any such guidance for this paradigm shift in 
environmental policy.   
 
With a more optimistic outlook Anthony Giddens, in his book the Politics of Climate 
Change (2009), advocates for tighter government presence in environmental policy as 
an opportunity to influence all aspects of environmental governance, including the 
carbon markets, and that states must force restraints on carbon market actors that 
would otherwise not be in place under a free-market system. On the issue of 
regulating environmental governance, Giddens notes the importance of the „ensuring 
state‟. The ensuring state outlines emissions reduction goals and subsequently works 
with industry and business to make sure that goals are met. However, this should be 
done with carrots and not sticks by outlining environmental policy that can be 
beneficial to all actors. Giddens‟ foundational argument is that industrialized 
democratic nations must lead the charge and work together to achieve climate change 
mitigation. Here he refutes the belief, held by Sherman and Smith (2007) that 
democratic societies are not capable of making serious adjustments in environmental 
policy because democratic states, of which most are primarily capitalistic, have vested 
too highly in materialism in their economies and are dominated by sectoral interests. 
Giddens writes that Smith and Sherman‟s authoritarian stance towards environmental 
governance does not trump a liberal democratic institution because of the positive 
history that liberal democracies have with the development of science and information 
exchanges to address socio-economic problems; two aspects in which 
authoritarianism has been lagging, both extremely important for the end goal of 













With a more skeptical perspective on current international climate change 
governance, David Victor (2001) and Victor et. al (2005) criticize the top-down 
approach, led by international organizations, as a workable solution to climate 
change. Victor prefers a „Madisonian‟ approach that builds a global regime from the 
bottom up, first enabling state policy to grow then followed by an international 
framework that links matured policies together. This is based on his analysis of past 
international treaties where compliance is difficult to attain when there are numerous 
unresolved bargaining issues between and among nation states. Victor recognizes the 
market based approach of the Kyoto Protocol to be important, and that it is not to be 
dismantled, salvaging the parts that have been working, but that states must first prove 
that they can implement national policies before an international treaty is feasible. 
Owing to a lack of a clear hierarchy in environmental governance where international 
schemes have any sort of authority, national schemes that overcome the lack of 
functional, strategic and organization components must be designed (Keohane and 
Victor; 2010, 14-15). Also, that the best way to build national schemes is through the 
involvement of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) and green 
business specialists. Obviously then, it can be said that Victor envisions the sort of 
international treaty that will not be achieved for a number of years, but one with solid 
foundations that is intrinsically linked to the economies of each individual state.  
 
On the topic of climate change economics, The Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change (Stern; 2007), commissioned by the UK government with lead author 
economist David Stern, is the most influential and most often cited publication. In 
over 700 pages, the Stern Report provides an analysis of the economics of climate 
change, with a particular focus on applying his findings to format policy suggestions. 
Stern finds that we can stabilize the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
by committing 1 percent of global GDP
3
 to the cause. From an international policy 
perspective Stern insists that carbon trading is the preferred market mechanism 
because it allows for flexibility between nations and can be designed without 
extinguishing global economic growth. With such high acclaim being received from 
the report, the United Nations First Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has 
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 In a later article Stern (2008) admits that he overestimated some of his calculations, and that in fact a 












adopted his opinions and reinstituted carbon trading as the preferential method for 
international climate change policy. However, the Stern Review has certainly not 
been without its critics (Giddens; 2009, Toll; 2009).  
 
The most persistent arguments against Stern‟s main findings are that extensive cap 
and trade should be implemented immediately as the most cost effective way to 
reduce the risks of climate change.  Bjørn Lomborg, a prominent climate change 
skeptic, is most vocal about these findings, insisting that humankind would benefit 
more by resisting serious actions towards climate change until more consistent 
scientific evidence is accumulated. Lomborg contends that it is more beneficial to 
hesitate before implementing strong action to prevent climate change, and rather 
pursue policies of adaption than mitigation at a lower cost to society (Lomborg; 2001, 
318). Wietzman (2007) argues that, while the Stern Review should gain merit for its 
in-depth descriptive analysis, Stern ignores conventional methods of economic 
analysis of climate change in favor of picking and choosing methods out of 
convenience that will support his prepositions. Weitzman rejects Stern‟s use of cost 
benefit analysis of climate change that relies on a particularly low discount rate, to 
which his findings are highly sensitive. Furthermore, Wietzman criticizes Stern‟s 
work on the premise that it is neither politically nor economically sufficient, 
attempting to bridge the two without fully achieving his ambitions in either discourse.  
 
Bumpus and Liverman (2008) suggest that the political economy of carbon emissions 
offsetting through the CDM produces inequalities due to its hierarchical nature. They 
insist that the CDM has been designed to be most successfully applied in more 
developed non-Annex 1 countries, considering implementation barriers that are more 
difficult to overcome in the least developed nations. The two authors criticize the 
CDM for its fundamental flaws in providing actual „additionality‟ or verifiable 
emissions reduction, as opposed to a „business as usual‟ scenario. They also note that 
the carbon offset markets have received further criticism because of their resemblance 
to neo-colonial practices that lack southern participation and northern transparency, 
resulting in a system in which industrialized countries accumulate wealth by dictating 
the rules. Bumpus and Liverman suggest increased regulation and a high inclusion of 
non-state actors to legitimize and stabilize the carbon markets (Liverman and 













In a similar argument concerning the shortcomings of global environmental 
governance in the carbon markets, Paterson (2010), looks at the current marketised 
global environmental governance structure by utilizing political economic theory to 
explain the tensions of capitalism between legitimation and accumulation. Paterson 
finds that within the carbon markets these tensions are most prevalent in the offset 
markets. Where Paterson finds a lack of legitimacy in the carbon markets is notably 
the „counterfactual methodologies‟ that create and allocate credits to be placed on the 
markets, which result in windfall profits and speculative practices. As Bernstein and 
many others suggest, „the new legitimacy concerns need to be placed in the context of 
the ongoing debate over the reconfiguration of global authority‟ (Bernstein; 2005, 
142). 
 
Larry Lohman, a renowned critic of carbon trading, refuses to accept that a quantity 
instrument is the mainstream climate change mitigation policy (Lohman; 2006). 
Instead, he believes that carbon trading, as a relatively new instrument, is prone to 
failure, applied only to save money for the rich in the short term. Lohman‟s answer to 
the climate change problem is a more direct policy that targets the use of fossil fuels. 
He includes more conventional methods in his climate change mitigation formula that 
be implemented to immediately reduce atmospheric GHGs, including; large scale 
public works programs, subsidy shifting, conventional regulation, green taxes, and 
other non-trading market mechanisms and legal action (Lohman; 2006, 330). The 
criticism towards such a „complicated blueprint‟ is that it involved too much public 
investment without specific private rewards for compliance, which Lohman refutes 
can be overcome with strong green movements and green alliances that will operate to 
implement these methods of environmental reform. Also, they will be more far-
reaching than market mechanisms, targeting full-scale makeovers or transport 
systems, and overhauling inefficient heating systems, as well as other technology 
sectors that are unnecessarily energy intensive. Though Lohman‟s arguments can be 
quite convincing, he appears idealistic, failing to appropriately address international 
political concerns that would accompany a completely public-led economic overhaul; 














The literature review presented outlines the many diverging opinions on how 
international governing structures, NGOs, and the business community can best 
respond to the climate change issue. The major themes of this debate include what 
policies (ie economic instruments) should be put in place and how time sensitive the 
issue is. The main findings are that different economic and political theories can be 
applied to provide a plethora of answers. Due to the unique situation of climate 
change which involves great minds in the areas of science, economics and politics 
working to present a solution, it is found in the literature that there are so many 
variables involved in the international environmental governance process that 
formatting a unanimous response will be nearly impossible. The following chapters 
argue that a flexible environmental governance strategy, that takes into account 
various paradigms, must be installed to gain the degree of large scale acceptance 
necessary for effective implementation. Additionally, environmental policy must 
include regulated state led institutions that can ensure legitimacy in the system.  This 
argument is made in the following chapters by analysizing the interdependence of 
politics, including the various climate change actors outlined in the stake-holder 
model of democracy, and economics. The argument for flexible, yet well regulated 
environmental governance will come full circle by first analyzing the politics of 
climate change and the tensions that have become clear between certain actors. 
Secondly, pages on the economics of climate change will further illustrate that the 
issue is quite complex, further demonstrating the need for a flexible system where 
adaptations can be made. Reflecting my argument, this section identifies the 
inconsistencies in climate change economics, owing to the preposition that no clear 
cut policy can be implemented to solve what could possibly be the largest 
international governance issue of the next era. The final chapters provide theoretical 
explanations to the present difficulties of developing a universally excepted 
environmental governance policy, with specific attention to the CDM concluding with 
general policy suggestions reflecting my thesis. 




















The concept of governance took on a paradigm shift between the late 90s and early 
21
st
 century (Arts; 2006, 178). In previous years the term governance was generally 
directed towards traditional governing bodies - states and international organizations. 
Now the concept has expanded to include the above, as well as various non-
governmental organizations and commercial sectors that present themselves in many 
different forms and functions. These organizations provide a necessary role as 
intermediaries between the global population and the governing bodies that make 
decisions over them. As a result, reflecting on the interconnected world we inhabit, 
non-state actors have grown to become powerful players in international negotiations. 
The nature of climate change and international environmental awareness is of a 
particular essence where non-state actors feel the necessity to get involved in global 
affairs, working at levels of governance that have, in the past, only been accessible to 
traditional actors. This paints a conceptual mapping of governance that disregards the 
old top-down paradigm when embracing that governance of today has undertaken the 
„diffusion of political power‟ to private organizations (Arts; 2006, 178).  
 
Consequently, environmental governance includes private actors outside of state and 
international organizations, identified as the wide range of political, economic, and 
social structures and processes that „shape and constrain‟ the various actors involved 
in the realm of environmental policy. Furthermore, environmental governance refers 
to the „multiple channels through which human impacts on the natural environment 
are ordered and regulated‟ (Levy and Newell; 2003, 3). Although environmental 
governance can take the form of many issues facing humanity‟s relationship with our 
environment, such as the management of rivers, wildlife, or particular ecosystems, 
this paper explores environmental governance with regard to actions intended to 















Actors in Environmental Governance 
 
The Role of Civil Society/NGOs 
 
To outline the involvement of civil society in environmental governance a general 
definition of civil society must be provided. A basic interpretation of civil society is 
an area of communal life that is publicly operated and exclusive of government 
enterprise, and whereby common goals are advanced through ideas, actions and 
demands on governments (Cohen and Arato; 1994, 1-4). Within environmental 
governance civil society most often takes the form of NGOs acting as a platform to 
voice a need for change in environmental policies. Within the global network of 
environmental NGOs (ENGOs) there are a multitude of goal-oriented ventures that 
fall under the heading of environmentalism.  Among others, included are groups that 
advocate for animal rights, ocean awareness, forest and biodiversity preservation, and 
the focus of this paper, groups that promote a greener more sustainable economy in 
pursuit of the reduction of atmospheric GHGs. The role of ENGOs in environmental 
governance can be partitioned into three groupings: 1) campaigners utilizing their 
networks and high public profiles to transfer ideas and information to society, think-
tanks and research based groups; 2) academic institutions that focus on particular 
issues in a problem-solving manner; 3) groups that represent certain business 
communities pursuing adjustments to environmental policy, (or the status quo) that 
will have significant effects towards the success of a particular industry (Gough and 
Shackley; 2001, 333).    
 
Important to note is the duality of climate governance. Climate governance is the sum 
of the governing of resource usage and the leveling off of atmospheric GHG 
concentrations, as the two targets for endeavors in climate change mitigation. ENGOs 
are deemed to be important in an operational capacity concerning the management of 
natural resources because they are able to utilize on the ground information with 
quick adjustments in resource usage, „making the impossible possible by doing what 
governments cannot or will not do‟ (Simmons; 1998, 87). This is true regarding 
natural resources when community-based organizations have a serious stake in the 












especially true in the developing world where there is a lack of governmental capacity 
to achieve meaningful adjustments in environmental governance targeted at specific 
communities. The wide variety of influence accomplished by ENGOs, where 
impartiality most often persists, aside from their commitment to the environment of 
course, results in the ability to issue varying degrees of legitimacy towards governing 
bodies and the decisions that they make (Gemmill and Bamidele-izu; 2002,1).  A neo-
Gramscian perspective stresses the utility of NGOs in environmental governance as 
not only bodies that can issue legitimacy to environmental decisions, but also as 
entities that can challenge decisions that are believed to be against the „global interest‟ 
(Ford; 2003, 129). 
 
This interpretation of an environmentally focused civil society accompanies the idea 
that civil society, in its relations within the state system, is furthering the 
democratization of environmental awareness when influential groupings within 
society are allocated a discursive space to function. In more democratic countries 
(countries that have also taken climate change mitigation more seriously), ENGOs 
have become persuasive political players, successfully advancing awareness onto the 
general population and, in turn, forcing such agendas onto political platforms.  
 
Although climate change ENGOs are, for the most part, of the same epistemic 
community whereby the incidence of climate change is accepted as the focal point of 
their activities, there are a number of ENGOs that are outside this community.  
Groups such as Global Climate Coalition (GCC), and the Climate Change Lobby 
(CCL) aggressively pursue a resistance against the curtailment of fossil fuel use. 
These organizations are most often vocal skeptics about the scientific findings of 
mainstream ENGOs pertaining to rising atmospheric temperatures. Such „climate 
contrarians‟ are successful in identifying the uncertainties that lie in international 
documentation regarding climate change, with a major focus on the findings of the 
UNFCCC, which, to their dismay, should be not be accepted as completely factual, 
but somewhat precarious (Gough and Shackley; 2001, 334).  Most often these 
groupings receive their financial support from industries that do not interpret 














Business Actors  
 
Termed „street level bureaucrats‟, employees of large firms are able to shape 
environmental policy through their actions on the ground. It can be stressed that the 
significance of these individuals is in the process of developing regulatory policy 
aimed at ameliorating environmental problems (Newell and Levy; 2003, 1). Major 
players in industry, where energy use is most highly concentrated and therefore 
climate change policy is proportionately targeted, are the primary actors in this 
segment of global civil society. They hold the power to influence environmental 
policy, but often tread the balance between mutual gains in the global commons and 
representing their own specific interests. Though industry receives the lion‟s share of 
blame for countering progressive global climate change policies, they have the means 
to become the largest participant in climate change mitigation outside of nation states.  
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) highlights the responsibility of 
industry in global efforts to mitigate climate change; 
 
‘Industry’s involvement is a critical factor in the policy deliberations relating 
to climate change. It is industry that will meet the growing demands of 
consumers for goods and services. It is industry that develops and disseminates 
most of the world’s technology. It is industry and the private financial 
community that marshal most of the financial resources that fund the world’s 
economic growth. It is industry that develops, finances and manages most of 
the investments that enhance and protect the environment. It is industry, 
therefore, that will be called upon to implement and finance a substantial part 
of governments’ climate change policies.’ (International Chamber of 
Commerce, 1995) 
 
However, industry is not a unified actor in environmental governance. For effective 
environmental governance in the wake of globalization, cooperation between the 
various industrial and business regimes must be accomplished at sustainable levels. It 
is important to note that no single group can gain substantial influence in this exercise 
or the others will refrain from participating in an effective manner. An example of 
such an outcome would be the hypothetical situation of solar power firms gaining 












move that would force the oil and gas industry away from the bargaining table. This 
cooperation must accommodate private actors‟ needs to overcome the current short-
lived ad hoc nature that environmental governance has been subjected to, dependent 
on calculated interests of individual groupings (Falkner; 2003, 73), where, instead, 
institutional norms outline a process to mitigate the differences between interest 
groups, which in turn will add legitimacy to any policy arrangement.  
 
Scientific Community  
 
It is believed that the greater the consensus towards environmental realities, the 
greater will be the cooperation on environmental issues that present themselves 
(Newell; 2000, 40). However, to date, the verdict on climate change is not unanimous, 
resulting in a position for states to justify inaction. Consensus on the realities of 
climate change is dependent on the findings of the various scientists and research 
institutions dedicated to the pursuit of bridging the gap between the known and the 
unknown concerning global warming. Within this camp the aforementioned 
organizations, the GCC and GCL, are motivated to question the findings of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). They use their extensive 
knowledge on the science of climate change as a definite source of power in the fora 
of environmental politics, consequently aiding in the suspension of climate change 
policy. Here information, in this case scientific knowledge on climate change, is 
recognized as one of the main sources of power in the international system.  
 
Prominent climate change scientists have been granted privileged access to state 
leaders, placing certain individuals in a substantial position to independently impact 
climate change policy. However, the literature on the subject does not provide 
evidence that the general scientific community seeks to influence decisions, but is 
rather neutral, only projecting their findings with purely scientific intensions (apart 
from lobby-orientated organizations and the politically motivated IPCCC, of course). 
Instead of pressuring decisions the scientific community provides for decision-makers 
the „deliberative framework‟ from which policy-makers can choose one option over 
another (Hempel; 1993, 23). This guidance is not only prescribed to decision-makers 
at the state and inter-state levels, but the general public to whom, in democratic states 












into the realm of environmental policy cannot be overemphasized, as noted by Litfin 
who states that, „the level of political involvement by scientists in the climate change 
issue is unprecedented in international relations‟ (Litfin; 1994, 192). 
 
Challenges in Environmental Governance  
 
A top down approach towards climate change governance looks first to international 
organizations as the solution builders for climate change mitigation. Traditionally, it 
has been presumed that individual states will independently attempt to solve their own 
environmental problems, but the incidence of climate change is beyond the reach of 
any one state. States are best situated to solve domestic problems like national 
deforestation or water pollution, but not climate change, a global issue that transcends 
national boundaries. The occurrence of climate change, accompanied by 
environmental degradation over multiple geographical areas, logically suggests that 
an authority above the nation state is best suited to address such a problem (Alcock; 
2008, 78,). As a result, the role of the nation state in climate governance becomes 
blurred because states define their roles in climate governance though their 
participation in international organizations. There are those that insist that a free-
market approach, utilizing economic instruments, can be applied by states to 
overcome the incidence of climate change, while others insist that advocating for 
environmental policy outlined by individual states be tightly monitored and 
implemented by national governments, and others in between. David Giddens outlines 
this difference in the responsibilities of nation states as actors in environmental 
governance to be that of the „enabling state‟, as opposed to that of the „ensuring state‟ 
(Giddens; 2009, 10). The enabling state will develop policy only to then step back and 
let others attempt to perform the intended consequence of that policy, assumedly 
private actors and non-governmental organizations. The ensuring state will take a 
more hands-on approach, designing environmental policy to the same degree as the 
enabling state, but also committing itself to the obligation of GHG reduction targets in 
an active role by working with private actors in a more fluid relationship. The role of 
the ensuring state is that of a „catalyzing force‟, stimulating innovation as well as 
regulating and monitoring such efforts, and is considered to be more effective, but at a 













On the international level, the largest climate change regime is spearheaded by the 
UNFCCC‟s Conference of the Parties (COP). The COP is a forum that is open to all 
states that have acted to implement the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto 
Protocol was established to incite deeper involvement by all states. However, only 
parties to the convention- signatories to the Protocol - can be made part of the 
decision-making process. For instance, only the COP Executive Board, a limited 
membership institution governing its carbon markets, can address any decision 
involving international emissions trading under the UNFCCC. As a major focus of 




The top down approach to climate governance is most suitably aligned with regime 
theory. Regime theorists have aligned themselves with the central realist belief that 
anarchy in the international system is the cause of power struggles between states, but 
differ in their interpretation of the international system in that cooperative rule-
making and rule-abiding can be a solution to overcoming this anarchy (Auer; 2000, 
160). Renowned regime theorist, Stephan Krasner, most often quoted for his work on 
regime complexes, defines regimes as, „principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which acto  expectations converge in a given issue-area‟ (Krasner; 
1983, 1). As the principal theoretical framework in the scholarship of environmental 
governance, regime theory is applied to analyses of climate change governance 
because it can explain the dynamics of cooperation and interdependence; two key 
attributes for action, which, at the core of climate governance, must be pioneered by 
states. Keohane and Victor illustrate this point in their work on environmental 
governance by stating that environmental regimes will be developed on the 
international level based on „conditions of complex interdependence‟ where partisan 
politics will consistently remain a major motivating factor on the individual state‟s 
actions at the level of international negotiations (Keohane and Victor; 2011, 3).   
 
Although regime theory is used as a point of departure for a theoretical analysis of 












to state-centricity. While regime theory succeeds in explaining cooperation, it falls 
short of including specific actors in environmental governance, such as NGOs, 
industry associations and firms, scientific communities and a variety of domestic 
actors which are not recognized under regime theory as holding the leverage in 
climate change negotiations that they have achieved (Levy and Newell; 2003, 5-6). 
Theoretical concepts of international political economy sufficiently add to the neo-
liberal institutionalist approach for a more clear and precise explanation of climate 
change governance. Notions of property rights, trade relations, market mechanisms, 
and privatization that are utilized in IPE theories are important to consider when 
looking into climate change negotiations, respecting the fact that global 
environmental governance is so closely intertwined with the global economy.   
 
Environmental regimes will cross over state boundaries in what would appear to be 
the fracturing of national environmental policy; an interpretation that alludes to the 
difficulty in studying environmental governance with a state-centrist approach. 
Simply, that each state will have various interests - often competing, that the 
government must account for when pursuing climate change policies. Owing to 
varying modes of production of and within states, and relying on different energy 
sources, a variety of interest-orientated environmental regimes have been formed.  As 
a result, the alignment of power, interests, information and beliefs is played out both 
at the international and domestic levels, and climate „clubs‟ are formed that seek to 
influence climate change policy reflecting their own interests, limiting free riding, and 
blocking the influence of groups that have opposing interests (Keohane and Nye; 
2001,52). Environmental regimes specifically designed for climate change mitigation 
are noticed at international levels, (UNFCCC, G-8, MEF (Major Economies Forum 
on Energy and Climate Change)), bilateral (EU-China Partnership on Climate 
Change), and national (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the north eastern US, 
California Emissions Trading Scheme) making environmental governance a highly 
fragmented apparatus.   
 
As political realities dictate, we must often work with the system that is available. In 
the case of climate change mitigation we have a non-concerted network of nation 
states and industrial sectors with diverse interests. Therefore, to appease each of these 












flexible and adaptable (Keohane and Victor; 2011, 17-18). Flexibility allows for 
different states, or even industrial sectors within those states, to commit to different 
means in pursuit of the same ends; atmospheric GHG reduction. A flexible 
mechanism also affords groups the ability to pursue feasible goals for reduction 
targets that are respective to the specifics of their economies (i.e. energy production, 
clean tech sector, margin for industrial efficiency improvements) having an advantage 
over „blanket‟ global reduction targets that result in a chain reaction of non-
compliance. Adaptability refers to the chronologic appropriateness of mitigation 
efforts and takes into account the sensitivities of domestic politics on a state‟s climate 
change policy, recognizing that between states there will be fluctuating degrees of 
support from society towards climate change policy. Consequently, it is important that 
different time-lines for means of GHG reduction implementations exist, specifically 
for developing countries that do not have the finances or the political willpower to 
make large adjustments in the near future.    
 
Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance  
 
Since the initial framework for climate change governance at the international level 
was designed through the UNFCCC in 1992, there has been substantial withdrawal 
from the intended pathway of the original mandate. This fragmentation, as illustrated 
by Bierman et al., is both cooperative and conflicting in nature (Bierman et al.; 2009, 
22). The mandate laid out in the UNFCCC is to prevent „dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system‟ (Gupta and Van Asselt; 2006, 83). Although this 
is the goal of all parties working in the sphere of „responsible‟ environmental 
governance, divergence has occurred on how exactly it is most appropriate to 
accomplish such a large goal. Cooperative elements of fragmentation occur when 
certain states band together and form their own climate governance regimes, separate 
from the Kyoto architecture. An example is the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU-ETS), which has been a successful venture, and is regarded by many as 
a pioneering commitment by European nations in the reduction of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases through international emissions trading and emissions offsetting in 
the developing world. Conflicting fragmentation has occurred with breakaway climate 












Development and Climate and the Major Economies Process on Energy Security and 
Climate Change, created by the United States in 2007 which provide an alternative 
form of governance that may result in states reducing or neglecting their 
commitments to the original UNFCCC partnership (Bierman et al.; 23, 2009).  
 
It is found through time projections in economic modeling that these fragmentations 
will severely hinder the cost efficiency of all regimes included in climate governance.  
Based on environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness and cost of distribution for 
environmental policy, it is concluded by Aldy, Barrett and Stavins that to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations and implement mechanisms that will also slow down 
resource depletion, a „broad-but-shallow‟ framework (less regimes) is preferable to a 
multitude of independently acting regimes (Aldy, Barrett and Stavins; 2003, 378). 
Therefore, it is necessary to build a framework that can accommodate all nation-
states, working towards progress by improving on the „shallowness‟ rather than 
extending the fragmented architecture that includes the regimes that have been created 
since 1992.   
 
Fault-lines in Environmental Governance  
 
The fragmentation of the climate change mitigation architecture can be explained 
from a structural perspective by looking at the difficulties involved in cooperation 
between environmental regimes. However, a more exhaustive agent-specific 
explanation for these difficulties is found by looking at the discrepancies between the 
parties involved within these regimes. There are four major fault lines in climate 
change negotiations. They can occur at all levels of environmental governance; state, 
regional entities, NGOs, and industrial sectors. Each of these fault lines have been 
present since climate change made it onto the international political agenda, and 
(though wavering in significance over the last 25 years
4
) continue to impede 
international dialogue geared towards mitigation efforts. In the pages of International 
Affairs, dating back to 1992, Matthew Paterson and Michael Grubb identify the four 
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 It is recognized that climate change became a major political issue in 1988, establishing the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), after a series of scientific conferences taking 
place in the 1980‟s which identified the rising levels of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere 












major fault-lines as; 1) the North-South divide; 2) Differing policy prerogatives of 
energy producers and non-energy producers; 3) Geographical location of states and 
their perceived resilience to the effects of climate change, and finally; 4), the division 
between polarized opinions towards climate change based on scientific uncertainties 
(Paterson and Grubb; 1992, 296).  The first and far most obstructive fault line, the 
North-South divide, will now be discussed in this section pertaining to the politics of 
climate change. The third and fourth, regarding perceived resilience and skepticism, 
have been addressed in the introduction and are proven to be less of a barrier during 
the commencement of climate change negotiations. The energy producers vs. non-
energy producers‟ quarrel will be covered at the end of this chapter, and elaborated on 
in the subsequent chapter which focuses on the economics of climate change and 
resource depletion.  
 
The North-South Divide 
 
The largest political test towards establishing international cooperation in climate 
change governance is in developed and developing countries reaching an agreement 
(Depledge and Yamin; 2009, 443, Whaley and Walsh; 2009, 1). The argument from 
the South is that the environmental problems that we are now faced with exist solely 
because of the North‟s particular pathways to development, and their ignorance of the 
repercussions of utilizing cheap fossil fuels. Rather than being restricted from doing 
the same, developing countries proclaim that they too should be able to develop using 
the cheapest materials available. They insist that they should be able to get rich first, 
only having to correct their behaviour once they reach an advanced stage of 
development. Most within the G77, a UN classification of the world‟s developing 
countries termed the „trade union of the poor‟ by ex-Tanzania president Julius 
Nyerere (1980; 7), point to socio-economic priorities of the present, such as poverty 
and unemployment, which they treat as problems of highest importance that can be 
best alleviated with the cheapest means of development possible, fossil fuels. In 
addition, developing countries reiterate that the North are pursing an agenda which 
will restrain their developmental capacity by imposing a degree of „environmental 
sensitivity‟ that is beyond their economic means and will only stall their progress 













From the perspective of the North, the general consensus is that sustainable 
development for the South, which implies the least possible reliance on fossil fuels, is 
in the best interest of the entire globe. The counter-argument from the North 
advocates that their inclusion of the South is not only in the global interest, but 
proportionally more so in the interest of the South. This is based on their insistence 
that developing countries pose the greatest risk from climate change, where large 
populations are susceptible to drought and crop failure in regions that produce, at 
current rates, barely enough to feed growing populations. In addition to this, 
developing countries with large populations living close to the sea do not have the 
means to quickly implement rescue efforts in the event of catastrophe, nor do they 
have the financial means to rebuild. For these reasons, northern countries have 
persistently pushed the agenda of sustainable development, with increased measures 
of resource efficiency, on the global south.   
 
As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China has been at the focal point of this 
debate. Many other developing countries can be „bought‟ to adapt to the North‟s 
climate change policy vision. China cannot. The leadership in Beijing insists that 
China should be allowed to continue to grow their economy on coal because they 
have large reserves and it is cheap and readily available, and that only national actors 
will have influence over their domestic environmental policy, consistent with China‟s 
overall stance of non-interference. This approach is achieved by China because the 
West holds very little economic sway over China in forcing changes in their methods 
of production, as the West relies more on cheap goods from China than China relies 
on the West for consumption of those goods (Haas; 2008, 6).   
 
The second fracture in the North-South Divide in global environmental policy 
concerns responsibility for financing the implementation of any policy that steers 
countries away from inefficient fossil fuel usage. The first aspect of responsibility is 
linked to how countries will pay for past damages to reach the intended emissions 
levels of 5% below 1990, the goal set by the initial Kyoto agreement. The South 
demands that a framework allocating a cost for emissions released should be 
cumulative and based on history rather than on an annual basis, as is advocated by the 












for being pressured away from the same methods of production that the North has 
used to gain economic prominence. The second aspect of this responsibility fracture 
concerns how reductions are measured. CO2 emissions generated in the South can be 
directly linked to economic growth, especially in developing countries that have little 
knowledge sector or clean tech industrial growth. If the annual amount of emissions 
that are to be accounted for track industrial output, and in turn development, the South 
will pay higher costs as a percentage of GDP. Although a significantly less nominal 
figure, a much higher percentage proportionate to their populations‟ income due to the 
fact that they have higher growth rates than northern countries.
5
 The argument of the 
South is once again merited on the reality that they did not cause the current climate 
problem so they should not be held as equals to the North in terms of responsibility 
for its amendment. This debate is advanced with one particular angle from China and 
India, both of which have large export economies. They argue about the design of 
emissions reduction policies that target producers of these manufactured goods. 
Instead, they advocate that consumers of goods should be targeted, most of which 
reach the markets of developed countries. This argument was most succinctly raised 
at the Bali Conference of the Parties in 2007 by senior Chinese officials claiming that 
they should not be punished for being the „factory of the world‟; that if China did not 
produce goods for the West then their emissions would be at least 30% less (Pan, 
Phillips and Chan; 2009,143). 
 
From the South, the solution to these discrepancies is simple. The Southern countries 
are eager to participate in progressive environmental policy, but in doing so have 
identified a position from which to negotiate privilege for participation. Privilege for 
the South is the transfer of Western capital for the implementation of environmental 
policies, industrial processes and agricultural and forestries management. Therefore, it 
is clear that the global agenda for environmentalism includes a global agenda for 
sustainable development in the South, whereby the effectiveness of environmental 
policy will be judged by the south, not only in terms of environmental successes, but 
also in terms of development achievements that address issues of global inequality 
(Najam; 2005, 317).  
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 As reported by the International Monetary Fund the average GDP of the OECD countries is just under 
3 percent, in comparison to the non-OECD countries, which are much higher.  China and India are 













The 2009 Copenhagen summit appeared to have been a platform for industrialized 
nations to make a great deal of progress in bridging this divide by presenting a deal to 
create a $100 billion Global Climate Fund (GCF) to expedite this wealth transfer. 
Although the commitment to create the GCF was fully agreed upon at last year‟s 
Cancun summit, developing countries have grown weary that rhetoric towards wealth 
transfer for climate change-orientated development is too far distanced from action. In 
the 2011 UN climate change negotiations in Panama a group of the least developed 
countries (LDCs) issued a statement that industrialized nations were reneging on 
commitments for the global climate fund, which includes $30 billion from the years 
2011-2013 as part of the overall $100 billion due by 2020 (Business Green; 2011). 
 
With the absence of an emissions reduction commitment from developing nations, 
particularly China and India, the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
Opposition to Kyoto was based on projections that developing nations will become 
some of the largest global emitters in the near future and they too should be accounted 
for in emissions reduction schemes. Under the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which passed 
through the US Senate by 95-0, the US became the only industrialized nation to opt 
out of Kyoto just prior to the third Conference of the Parties summit. Lack of support 
from the United States has been interpreted as the largest weakness in Kyoto, failing 
to include both the largest emitter at the time, as well as the most important global 
player in international affairs. The explanation for non-ratification of Kyoto from the 
USA is mainly because of the impending rise of China, which was not given an 
emissions reduction target even when it was clear that they would become the largest 
emitter shortly after the turn of the millennium. Instead, China was grouped in with 
least developed nations and given identical privilege under the Protocol, which the US 
identified as a major economic advantage in trade competitions.   
 
This points to the issue of equity in climate change mitigation. Climate change is a 
global public good, where all parties can benefit from the reduced emissions from a 
group of states, and are exposed to climate risks if any one large emitter does not 
contribute to reduction efforts. Owing to the fact that there is no body that can strictly 
enforce climate change commitments, the state of environmental governance is highly 












states will either agree to climate treaties and not comply, or not agree at all and 
become free riders on climate change policy: A disincentive that is surely heightened 
by the national interests of states and the perceived costs of joining reduction 
schemes. This is the greatest paradox of international agreements, whereby the greater 
the global net benefits of free riding exist, the greater there is an incentive to free ride 
(Cazorla and Toman; 2000, 4). 
 
Deficiencies in Regime Theory: Utilising IPE as an Explanatory Tool in 
Environmental Governance  
 
A regime theory analysis to explain environmental governance can be assisted by IPE 
theorists with the realization that regime theory, as the traditional theoretical 
standpoint in the discourse on environmental politics, is inadequate because of its 
major assumption; that states and markets can be looked at as independent of one 
another (Newell and Paterson; 1998, 680). Owing to this assumption, applying regime 
theory to environmental governance focus too fully on the political players. Here the 
failed attempts of cooperation are not recognized because the major players, members 
of the various regimes outside of traditional governing structures are not given their 
due respect. Instead, to properly explain environmental governance a wider 
theoretical standpoint must be applied that advocates a larger degree of power in the 
international system to international non-governmental organizations including 
multinational corporations who play a major role in designing and implementing 
environmental policy.  
 
An analysis of failed attempts for cooperation, that regime theory does not fully 
comprehend, can be properly explained by using an IPE approach. An IPE approach 
identifies the interconnectivity of a nation‟s economy, and therefore its major 
economic actors, with its environmental policy. Using this approach it is quickly 
realized that the main hindrance for cooperation in adapting environmental policy at 
both intra and inter-state levels (specifically for more industrialized countries) is the 
connection between fossil fuel-based energy production with the nation‟s economy. 












negotiations, because the more energy intensive a country is the more important a role 
it has new climate policies.  
 
For energy producers, policy that is designed to mitigate climate change is met with 
indignation that such policies are not a matter of conducting different business, but 
rather the „dissipation‟ of their business (Rowlands; 1995, 137). Therefore, energy 
producers go to great lengths in lobbying against mitigation polices such as carbon 
taxes and emissions restrictions. The energy producers‟ lobby provides rhetoric that 
any energy restriction will be followed by job loss, increased energy costs, and a 
severe reduction in the national GDP. The influence that oil companies have over 
national environmental policy is illustrated in the case of Shell Oil in 1992, when they 
gave the Dutch government an ultimatum; to either retract their intention to adopt 
specific environmental policies, or face the event of Dutch Shell‟s relocation (Newell 
and Paterson; 1998, 684). The Dutch government immediately caved and Shell Oil 
was able to prevent the intended policies. This incident illustrates the structural 
constraints that energy capital can have on capitalist societies which link GDP growth 
with institutional success (Newell and Paterson; 1998, 691). Here institutional 
success, which is accompanied by the retention of power, is tied to economic 
achievements that rely on „advancing the general interests of capital‟ (Burnham; 
1990, 180), which in energy producing states is largely tied to promoting energy use, 
both domestically and internationally.  
 
The fault-line in environmental governance that occurs between energy producers 
and non-energy producers can be explained through Putnam’s two level games 
(Putnam; 1998). Internationally, states may appear to have good intentions to adopt 
international environmental treaties, but one must look at the intra-national level. 
Countries that do not have a strong domestic opposition to environmental reforms 
which could effect energy production, (i.e. Sweden and Finland who are considered to 
have two of the most progressive environmental policies) are better situated to adopt 
emissions reduction treaties. In opposition, states where large proportions of the 
population hold contention on the issue of fossil fuel energy restrictions, such as 
quotas or taxes, will find it difficult to adopt such policies. Even though it may appear 
on the surface (regime theory) that a country is prepared to commit itself to 












Canada was one of the largest contributors to the design of the Kyoto Protocol, and 
therefore was predicted to become a leader in its implementation. However, over a 
decade later, Canada has fallen far short of its Kyoto commitment and has become a 
large disappointment in the international community in regards to environmental 
governance. By utilizing Putnam’s typology this stagnation to incite progressive 
environmental reforms is explained by the domestic political prerogatives of the 
Conservative government during this period. Led by Prime Minister Steven Harper, 
the Conservative Government of Canada who relies heavily on the support of the 
Western provinces where a vast majority of Canadian oil production is conducted, 
and therefore environmental reforms for energy producers would be concentrated. If 
Harper were to implement Canada’s Kyoto commitments (installed by the previous 
Liberal government) he would be subjected to a loss of support in those provinces, 
and possibly the loss of office, explaining why, on the domestic level, it has been so 
difficult for him to consolidate Canada’s Kyoto commitments. 
 
This chapter has explained the political tension that climate change mitigation policies 
have, and will continue in the future, to bring forth; by focusing on different countries 
at different stages in development and the roles they see themselves playing in climate 
initiatives.  Furthermore, it is established that the traditional regime approach cannot 
fully analyze these tensions because they are not only rooted at the level of national 
government but through non-conventional international policy decision makers. By 
utilizing an IPE approach in attempts to ameliorate these conflicts, a more bodied 
explanation can be formed, a necessary step to solving this conundrum of cooperation 
in environmental governance. Although this chapter has focused most heavily on the 
political aspects of climate change negotiations, the IPE standpoint, as the accepted 
theoretical discourse in this thesis, has not been fully developed. The next chapter will 
delve deeper into the economics of climate change, focusing on certain findings, 
concepts and issue areas that will weigh heavily on future climate negotiations; in my 
attempts to further argue that flexible environmental policy that will be welcomed by 















Chapter 3- Economics of Climate Change  
 
Natural Capital and the Necessity of Risk Aversion  
 
The world economy relies on the availability of the necessary space and natural inputs 
for the various production processes, which have provided for mankind the 
foundations for progress. Natural capital, which we are beginning to appreciate as 
finite in existence, refers to nature‟s resources and various ecosystems. The concept 
of natural capitalism is a building block towards protecting this capital by adding 
value to the preservation of nature‟s attributes. The concept identifies the 
„interdependency between production and use of human-made capital and the 
maintenance and supply of natural capital‟ (Hawkins, Lovins and Lovins; 1999, 3). 
More specifically, the climate debate seeks to reduce harmful effects to the earth‟s life 
supporting system - the recycling of oxygen and carbon dioxide between plants and 
animals. The system relies on a critical balance whereby dangerous atmospheric 
gases, mainly carbon dioxide, are currently being over-produced. As these gases build 
up in the atmosphere the capacity of the system to maintain this balance is 
overextended. As a result, the earth‟s climate has increased in average temperature, 
and the foundation for production has become threatened. We have already lost 70 
percent of the world‟s coral reefs in the last decades, as well as 25 percent of marine 
ecosystems. On land, in the last half century, we have witnessed a loss, in total, of a 
fourth of the world‟s topsoil, and a third of the world‟s forest cover (Hawkins, Lovins 
and Lovins; 1999, 4).   
 
We expect technical innovations to overcome non-renewable resource scarcity and 
provide us with the foundations for a sustainable economy, but what we are beginning 
to realize is many of these these natural resources, which are to replace fossil fuels, 
particularly forest stocks and non-food competitive bio-fuels, are at an accelerated 
rate of decline that must be properly managed now rather than having to deal with a 
magnified energy crisis in the future. Therefore, it can be determined that the issue of 
environmental governance is twofold; that of climate change, which is almost entirely 












its escalation, and an impending energy crisis due to the depletion of renewable and 
non-renewable resources.     
 
It has become apparent that at no point in the near future can we expect scientists to 
give us a „magic answer‟ identifying the exact effects that we are having on natural 
capital (Gardiner; 2004, 264). Such findings would give policy-makers the necessary 
information to design mitigation efforts that are most cost efficient, or ideally, there is 
the possibility that the scientific community could tell us that there is nothing to 
worry about; that the earth is just going through its natural cycle of increased 
temperature and that we have no impending natural resource crisis. Given the 
uncertainty of the issues at hand it is inadvisable to simply carry on our behavior until 
the resolution of this question, if such information ever materializes at all. From a risk 
management perspective, it is necessary to act now rather than wait and see what 
happens, because effectively, the magnitude of the risk that we would be managing is 
practically unquantifiable due to the precarious nature of climate change. Taking 
action now, in the form of carbon taxes or emissions restrictions, would be more 
beneficial than waiting, even if climate change does not materialize (De Leo et al.; 
2001; 478 and Woodward and Bishop; 1997, 506). In the event that climate change 
does not transpire, the investment made through mitigation will not go unappreciated. 
It is estimated that 1-2 percent of global GDP could stabilize global GHG 
concentrations and prevent us from becoming increasingly vulnerable to climate 
change, and will have been spent on giving us a more biodiverse, clean and desirable 
planet (Stern; 2008, 7).  
 
Equity, Discount Rates and Cost Benefit Analysis in Climate Change 
Economics  
 
In climate change economics there are two interrelated variables that play a crucial 
part in financial modeling, discount rates and equity. Inter-temporal equity involves 
the amount of the burden of climate change mitigation that we should place on our 
society, vs. the sum that is to be left for future generations to face. To determine cost 
effective climate change policy, for the purpose of comparing different policies, a 












in time (Arrow et al.; 1995, 1). Under the same finance principle as „time value of 
money‟, where investments are determined upon the size of cash flows at different 
points in time, the discount rate is used to determine what costs to the economy are 
deferred by acting against climate change sooner rather than later, and the reverse. 
Arrow et al. (1995,1) illustrates this dilemma succinctly by comparing two mutually 
exclusive investments; the reduction of GHG emissions compared with machines and 
education. If money were spent today on emissions control rather than machines and 
education, and the rate of return on emissions reductions exceeded that of machines 
and education, than future generations would benefit more with the decision to invest 
in climate change. However, a high discount rate for climate change investments will 
encourage the argument that it is better for future generations to reap the benefits of 
present day consumption, (economic growth related to the investment in machines 
and education) and pay a larger burden of the economic costs of GHG reductions 
themselves. Certainly the discount rate/equity debate is one of the most complex 
issues surrounding climate change, as it intertwines ethics, scientific projections on 
pollution, and environmental economics.  
 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
Similar to discount rates and inter-temporal equity, conducting a cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) on climate change mitigation is highly sensitive to the scientific projections 
for future climate change. A CBA for climate change mitigation has been frequently 
applied by economists to three central questions concerning emissions reductions; 
what is the ideal quantity of reductions that should take place? When should 
emissions be reduced? And how should we go about reducing them (Munasinghe et 
al.;41, 1995)?  
 
The first question - how much should be reduced? - looks to find a marginal cost of 
abatement policy that is less than the marginal cost of damages over time. The 
second, concerning the timing of abatement policy, looks to avoid damages that are 
irreversible. It assumes that there is a point of no return where abatement policies will 
no longer be sufficient to mitigate climate change. Also, this question sets out to 












abatement that are significantly less than marginal damages. Reduced costs that are a 
result of innovation in production found through, specifically, energy usage research 
and development methods.  
 
Conducting a CBA to answer questions two and three „how much emissions 
reductions should take place and when?‟ brings to light the predictive nature of the 
entire exercise, based on assumptions that could easily backfire, resulting in a 
situation where future generations would have to pay for our ignorance. Assumptions 
on future emissions, warming patterns and magnitude, and other climate change-
related aspects such as rainfall and sea level rises are based, to a large degree, on 
scientific work that is highly uncertain. Climate change scientists can predict that 
these things will or will not happen with relative confidence, but currently they are 
not able to be precise enough to meet the demands of a CBA that uses causality 
models to determine a monetary value for the welfare costs of climate change (Toll; 
2009, 2-3, and Broome; 1992, 1). They may be able to predict scenarios, for example, 
where a certain increase/decrease in rainfall will result in the increase/decrease of 
agricultural yields and monetize those yields, but there is no certainty in the estimates 
regarding the levels of rainfall, or the extent to which these fluctuations will be 
human-induced. This breed of uncertainty affects the reliability of any cost benefit 
analysis that has implications for policy decisions.   
 
Although there are models that use very precise details to predict the costs of global 
climate change at various warming scenarios, (see Nordhaus (1994), Rehdanz and 
Maddison (2005), Mendelsohn, Schlesinger, and Williams (2000), among others) 
there is very little consensus on which numbers are appropriate in their application, 
and, therefore, many different cost benefit analysis models have been built that 
provide results which are highly incompatible.  Martin Weitzman attributes this 
difficulty in utility analysis to, „deep structural uncertainty in the science, coupled 
with an economic inability to evaluate meaningfully the catastrophic losses from 
disastrous temperature changes.‟ (Weitzman; 1, 2008).   
 
Also, questions regarding the depth of emissions reductions that should take place are 
difficult to formulate from a holistic global perspective. The preserved quality of life 












greenhouse gas concentrations are, in principal, global in nature, geographically, 
certain societies are at much higher risk than others, and therefore can attach higher 
benefits to climate change policies. This outlines a dilemma in global climate change 
policy where different states will be rationally willing to pay different costs at 
different times (Toll; 2009, 35, Antroff et. al; 2009, 847 and Munasinghe et. al;1995, 
45). If one state determines that it is important to mitigate climate change because of a 
foreseen environmental catastrophe, but others do not, then any reductions made by 
the first state, and not followed suit by the others, will have little positive effect.  
 
Only after accepting that it is beneficial to some degree to mitigate climate change, 
the third question asks how we should go about doing so. Uncertainties in the first 
two questions provide some guidance for the third. Since we cannot outline an ideal 
pathway for climate change policy, with cost benefit analysis only providing a loose 
guide of the cost inherited by climate change and the inputs necessary to avoid these 
costs, it is essential that emissions reduction policies that retain flexibility be 
implemented. This is because improved knowledge that accompanies more certain 
predictions, which can be utilized in a more precise analysis, will inevitably provoke 
changes in abatement policy goals. As a central question in this paper, the topic of 
how to reduce emissions will now be explored further.   
 
Why the Market will not Correct Itself in Time  
 
The importance of state-led emissions reduction schemes is evident because of the 
market‟s inability to correct itself, and to recognize the value of the atmosphere‟s 
function as a sink for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The market has no 
way of reacting to atmospheric damage in an appropriate temporal manner, meaning 
that if the market were to correct itself for the problem of rising atmospheric 
temperature caused by rapid capitalist industrialization, it would be too late. This is 
because naturally there is no price point that would indicate that carbon sinks are 
overly saturated with GHG emissions and therefore there is no market-based incentive 
to limit emissions, aside from the event of drastic climate change further down the 













To many, a tentative answer to the for-mentioned problem of emissions reduction and 
the subsequent problem of depleted resources that follows overuse is increased 
resource efficiency. However, this may not be a formidable solution.  Resource 
efficiency is not necessarily followed by reductions in their use. In the fields of 
engineering and economics, resource efficiency has different meanings. Engineers 
define resource efficiency as a situation when less inputs are used to attain the same 
amount of outputs, differing from the economist‟s perspective on resource efficiency, 
(also labeled resource productivity) whereby the calculations are not strictly achieved 
through inputs and resultant outputs, but rather a measurement of the outputs in terms 
of the disbursement of capital that it takes to achieve those outputs, comparing the 
market value of goods produced to the monetary costs of all inputs. In a broader 
sense, economic efficiency of resources is attained when fiscal policy is being utilized 
best to minimize the cost of production (Hawkins, Lovins and Lovins; 2008, 9). 
 
In the section to follow I will look at the discrepancy between the engineer‟s 
definition of resource efficiency as a solution to the problem of resource depletion, 
and then address the problem from an economic perspective, focusing on „resource 
productivity‟ by applying economic instruments to alleviate climate change, as well 
as a pending resource crisis. To distinguish the two very similar concepts; resource 
efficiency is the engineer‟s interpretation, while resource productivity will be that of 
the economist‟s in regards to efficient modes of production.  
 
Resource Efficiency  
 
A simplistic answer to climate change mitigation and resource depletion is to reduce 
resource consumption. Reducing resource use, and in turn reducing GHG emissions 
directly by evoking restrictions, is not a possible policy option because politicians and 
economists alike remain wary of implementing reforms that may interrupt economic 
growth due to the magnitude of the underlying consequences involved in a stagnant 
world economy where sizable population growth is imminent. Another possible 
scenario that is intended to reduce resource consumption is resource efficiency, 
accomplished through the innovation of process engineers targeting various modes of 












same economic growth can be achieved if resource efficiency is heightened and, in 
turn, fewer resources will be needed to maintain growth in the global economy, 
resulting in a decreased amount of GHGs being released into the atmosphere.  
 
Resource efficiency is definitely part of any solution towards growth in energy 
consumption, although, as a premise for the reduction of greenhouse gases it is not 
without its denouncements. Chief Economist at the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, Jeff Rubin, declares that assumptions of energy efficiency, (targeted at 
non-renewables) are unrealistic answers to reducing energy consumption. Rubin uses 
an example of the OPEC oil shocks to illustrate his point (Ruban; 2007, 1). When the 
price of oil rose drastically in the 1970‟s, oil-intensive industries increased their 
efficiency greatly. However, consumption was not lowered but rather heightened, 
because now more could be produced with less oil, encouraging producers to retain 
regular profits by using more oil that was bought at higher cost. When prices were 
normalized consumption went through the roof.     
 
The rules of supply and demand are illustrated by Howarth (1997) to show this 
discrepancy. Consumers‟ income, as a necessity to increase demand for energy, will 
augment growth in the world economy, but increased growth will also be tracked by 
energy needs. If the growth effect is large, which can be supported by increased 
energy use at lower (more efficient) costs, increased energy consumption will occur at 
rates higher than if efficient technologies had not been implemented (Howarth; 1997, 
2). The expected growth effect is interpreted as too large to be countered by the 
energy efficiencies when market expansion is left to take advantage of lower input 
costs. Brookes points to this dilemma by showing, through economic models, that 
„increases in multifactor productivity could well be greater than the increase in energy 
productivity, producing a rise in total energy consumption notwithstanding a fall in 
the energy consumption per unit of output‟ (Brookes; 358, 2000). 
 
Ernst Weizsacker‟s work in Factor 5, which envisions a practical pathway towards 
increasing energy efficiency along with resource consumption, stresses the need for 
making the consumption of resources expensive (Weizsacker; 2009, 7).  Weizsacker 
insists that we should be working in the direction of cost structures that promote 












expensive that total resource consumption rests in a perfect balance with a sustainable 
supply of renewable (or recycled) resources, and the resulting ability of the biosphere 
to assimilate the associated pollution and by-products‟ (Weizsackers; 2009, 310).  The 
following chapter will outline some of these cost structures that are intended, over 
time, to find the necessary equilibrium in our methods of production that limit 
environmental degradation for a sustainable future. Here, the idea of resource 
productivity is utilized.   
  
This chapter outlines the difficulty in climate change economic accounting, expanding 
on the ideas of the previous chapter which focuses on who should pay for these 
mitigation efforts by visiting the question of when should they be implemented? 
Different economic models can be established to provide very different answers, but 
without any definite certainty or rigid answers on the actual effects of climate change 
and resource usage these models are rather useless.  Regardless of the policy that is 
chosen, there is no reason to believe that an unregulated  free market will solve this 
problem in-time to properly manage the supply and demand of natural capital, 
therefore it must be accepted that workable policy is to be designed that can be 
adopted to respond to changes in information on natural capital. This further 
exemplifies the important relationship between political and economic factors and 
how they must be responsive to one another in the design of policy. Illustrating again 
that it is necessary for political actors to manage and design policy that includes 
dynamic climate change economic beliefs.  One example of the necessity for more 
regulated policy that incorporates a plethora of ideas is the topic of resource 
efficiency. Many politicians advocate spending large amounts of money on research 
and design facilities that produce more efficient energy technologies, often their 
foremost weapon against climate change. This is part of the answer to climate change 
but not the entire solution, as it has been proven that efficiency alone may not have 
the desired effects on resource usage; actually making fossil fuel usage cheaper and 
resulting in the desire to produce or burn more. A more effective policy would not 
only include increasing industrial efficiency  on the production side but finding the 
correct equilibrium to increase the cost of production without resulting in to large of 
economic malaise.  With an understanding of the major actors in environmental 
governance and the many push and pull factors that influence climate change policy 












the policy that has been implemented and what is wrong. Specific attention is paid to 










































Chapter 4- Carbon Markets  
 
Market-Based Instruments to Mitigate Climate Change 
 
Marked based environmental policies are designed to utilize the 
efficiency/productivity of the market to achieve policy goals. They are used because 
they can achieve these goals at lower cost than specific „command and control‟ 
government regulations that target emissions levels through various methods, which 
can be inconsiderate of abatement costs, and often take a more all-inclusive approach 
by setting uniform control targets without much actor flexibility in how these targets 
are met (Stavins; 2001,1-2). Market mechanisms are deemed appropriate policy 
instruments because they have both demand and substitution effects on energy usage. 
The demand for energy is to be lowered due to higher energy costs that accompany 
either emissions taxes or emissions limits, while simultaneously substitution for 
cleaner modes of production is encouraged, which are not subjected to restrictions or 
loss of marginal earnings.  
 
The most pervasive form of environmental regulation is command and control. 
Command and control, in its most basic form, is where an authority will determine the 
necessary course of action to produce an intended result by collecting information and 
then commanding the polluter to undergo specific measures to control the pollution in 
a very structured strategy (Kolstad; 139, 2000). Because of the hands-on nature of 
such an exercise it is deemed to be highly inefficient. For example, in emissions 
reductions schemes, the regulator would have to assess each particular industry and 
determine the necessary steps that it must take to meet the overall demands of 
emission reduction targets utilizing a large amount of resources to gather all of the 
information. Furthermore, command and control is cost-inefficient because it can 
curtail cost saving innovations because it forces producers to follow certain emissions 
reduction practices rather than let them find their own methods at a perceivably lower 
cost.  
 
This paper accepts that any suitable mechanism for emissions reductions by 












and quantity mechanisms. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue for 
or against either pricing or quantity instruments, capturing this debate in its entirety, I 
will look briefly at some of the advantages and disadvantages of each. I follow this 
brief analysis with a further analysis of the quantity instrument because cap and trade 
has become the most utilized method of international mitigation policies.  
 
Economic instruments will allow for increased flexibility at the lowest overall cost to 
society for those with both high and low abatement costs, meanwhile harnessing the 
free-market to spur innovation in modes of production. From an economic perspective 
there are many parallels in the two proposed market mechanisms to control carbon 
emissions; tradable permits and emissions taxes, effectively, if subjected in a 
competitive environment, both will produce very similar results in cost efficiency and 
emissions reductions (Stern; 2008, 24 and Smith; 2008, 10). This is because a tax rate 
(or price on carbon) can be designed to increase incentives to reduce emissions to a 
certain level, while a permit system (with a cap) can be created to establish a 
benchmark price for carbon emissions. Although the degree of pollution abatement 
can reach an equilibrium between both policies, there is a major difference in the two 
economic instruments; found in the particular „certainties‟ that each assumes from its 
enactment, either a limit to emissions in the quantity-based trading system, or a 
definite price on carbon in emissions tax policies; information that can have large 
consequences on fiscal environmental polices, and therefore is imperative information 
in political negotiations. 
 
Carbon cap and trade involves setting a cap on emissions for a certain amount of time; 
annualized emissions targets under current policies. The cap will be represented by a 
specified number of emissions permits allocated to emitters, either for free or 
purchased. Emitters are then permitted to produce as many emissions as they require 
as long as they hold the necessary permits. If they do not hold the correct number of 
permits they either face penalties, or can purchase permits from other emitters who 
have an excess of permits. By creating a market for emissions permits, the policy 
simultaneously attaches a price to carbon, encouraging industrial players to become 
more efficient in order to avoid purchasing added abatement permits at the end of a 
year, or from benefiting from the sale of unused permits. Since industrial innovators 












at the lowest possible cost, strain on the economy that is caused by emissions 
reduction policy will be at a minimum cost, a key attribute to carbon cap and trade as 
a flexible tool for climate change mitigation policy.  
 
Cap and Trade Policies  
 
I will now go into more detail about carbon cap and trade, the quantity-based 
instrument that the Kyoto Protocol has adapted to meet its emissions reductions 
targets. Cap and trade has its roots in the United States Clean Air Act of 1990, 
designed by Robert Stavins, an Environmental Economist working out of Harvard 
University. Each year the US Environmental Protection Agency auctions off a set 
number of emissions allowances to the polluters, putting a „cap‟ in the aggregate 
amount of sulfur dioxide emissions released, and penalizing with fines those who go 
beyond their emissions quotas. Allowances are traded amongst industrial players on 
the Chicago Board of Trade, or retired for the benefit of the environment. The system 
has been accredited with promoting a large degree of efficiency in industries that rely 
on emitting sulfur dioxide, as well as eliminating acid rain, which was previously a 
major environmental hazard in the US. The current Kyoto framework has been 
inspired by the success of the Clean Air Act as a flexible quantity-based instrument.  
 
Similar to the Clean Air Act, Kyoto cap and trade allocates a certain amount of 
emissions permits, also known as carbon credits or Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs) under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDMs), to each of the 
industrialized counties (excluding the USA, the only industrialized nation that did not 
ratify Kyoto). These permits are then divided up within the nations as seen fit. If the 
owner of an emissions permit does not need to produce as many emissions as it is 
entitled to, the owner is allowed to sell carbon credits on the carbon markets to a state 
or industrial actor in need of increasing their emissions allotment to avoid 
penalization. The idea behind emissions trading is to meet emissions targets at a 
minimized cost, with the option of reducing the cap or number of allocated permits, to 
drive up the price of permits, and in turn, lowering the amount of total emissions in 
participant states according to the laws of supply and demand. Decreasing the supply 












production that reduce the amount of greenhouse gases which would otherwise have 
been released into the atmosphere. Those that can achieve emissions reductions are 
able to exploit gains from the trade of emissions permits, while those that cannot 
reduce their emissions because the costs of doing so are too high or infringe too 
largely on their profit margins, are able to lower their compliance costs by purchasing 
CERs on the carbon markets, and/or permits from other players; thus, an 
advantageous exchange for both actors with high and low compliance costs, as 
opposed to strict emissions controls or taxes that do not allow for interaction (trade) 
between the two parties (Fisher, Kerr, and Toman; 2001, 109). 
 
The appeal of a quantity instrument is that it can be designed to allow for a fixed 
amount of emissions. These fixed amounts can range in their aggressiveness to 
combat climate change, an appropriate attribute that is used to appease signatories of 
Kyoto that otherwise would not agree to homogenous environmental policies. The 
appropriateness of individual states to be treated differently, as is likened to a quantity 
instrument, has given cap and trade political prowess over carbon taxes. However, 
political resistances to all types of CO2 abatement policies are present. This is due to 
the fact that these policies, both quantity and pricing instruments, will undoubtedly 
place heavy financial burden on certain industries that are energy intensive, such as 
utilities companies and oil refineries. Instruments, taxes and cap and trade can 
significantly reduce the profit margins of these energy intensive industries, and can 
slow economic growth when costs for energy consumption are heightened. Politically, 
these groupings have a large degree of power in national policy-making due to their 
material and organizational capacities, as well as the importance that they play in 
national progress, and thus are able to avoid abatement policies (Goulder; 2001,125, 
2001). The irony is that if these industries are not targeted then the entire exercise will 
fail to bear fruit, with a large proportion of all industrial emissions not subjected to 
abatement policies. Here, one of the largest advantages of cap and trade is noticed; it 
allows governments the flexibility to auction off permits as they see fit, giving them 
the benefit to distribute the burden of abatement policies more evenly by giving 
certain industries access to less expensive or free permits, while maintaining 













Although the Kyoto Protocol was, at first, commended for its reach around the globe, 
the largest and most exceptional carbon trading scheme is the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The EU ETS is considered to be the pioneer in 
carbon market implementation at a multinational level, beginning in 2005 with a 
subsequent two-year trial period, the years that Kyoto began to waiver, and 
subsequently faltered, with recurrent noncompliance issues from most parties. The 
EU ETS has, since 2007, become a guideline for emerging carbon markets, and is 
considered a successful enterprise, even if perhaps it is still in need of some tweaking. 
The EU markets have provided for us an example of an influential initiative to 
mobilize the free-market for the purpose of environmental protection. Currently, 
under the EU ETS, there are several billion Euros crossing European borders each 
month in emissions credit purchases, illustrating the significance of the European 
carbon markets to date (Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis; 2010, 2). Also, the EU 
ETS has accepted additional abatement mechanisms, most notably the CDM, to be 
allowed for European states to meet their emissions reductions targets.   
 
Without going any deeper into the debate between carbon taxes and cap and trade, 
outlined are the key points made in favor of the quantity based instrument over a 
carbon tax; 
 
1) It is difficult for countries to approve an internationally harmonized tax.  
 
2) Trading supports wealth transfers to the developing nations, where taxes do 
not.  
 
3) Trading will support a lobby in the private sector in favor of tighter targets.  
 
4) Trading is preferred by both environmental and industrial lobby groups. The 
former enjoy the certainty of an emissions cap and the latter have an aversion 
for anything ‘tax’, opting for the alternative.  
 
5) Carbon trading promotes the creation of certain firms that have special 
expertise in applying their trade as facilitators for emissions reduction, 













6) Explained with a useful carrot-stick analogy, where taxes are the ‘stick’, 
simply a business cost; tradable permits being the ‘carrot’ in an opportunity 
to achieve increased profits. (Hepburn; 378, 2007). 
 
Involving the Developing World: The Clean Development Mechanism  
 
Along with international emissions trading between the 37 Annex 1 countries, the 
CDM was created under the Kyoto Protocol. In article twelve Kyoto outlines the 
CDM as a process for non-Annex 1 countries to become involved in emissions 
reduction schemes. The CDM allows for non-Annex 1 countries to create CERs and 
trade them within the Kyoto framework to Annex-1 countries that need to offset their 
emissions. The idea behind the CDM is that carbon emissions that are released 
anywhere into the atmosphere contribute to increases in global atmospheric 
temperatures equally. Rather than paying large abatem nt costs to reduce emissions 
locally, the option of reducing emissions elsewhere at a lower cost exits under the 
CDM. By design, creation of a CER is equivalent to 1 metric ton of CO2 reductions. 
The project developer must prove that his project would not have happened without 
the CDM in place; that the wealth transfer that is facilitated by the carbon markets is 
the catalyzing force behind emissions reduction projects.  
 
Under the CDM there are two key aspects; baseline and additionality. The baseline is 
the number of emissions realized under circumstances of „business as usual‟ or no 
changes made to less efficient modes of production or traditional lifestyles that are 
energy intensive. Additionality is the number of emissions saved by the 
implementation of the CDM project that would not have happened under 
circumstances of business as usual, and is correlated to the number of CERs attained. 
To calculate additionality the actual carbon emissions released, once a project has 
gone online, is subtracted from the baseline. Numerous methodologies to determine 
how many CERs can be accumulated from the various acceptable projects are 
outlined by the CDM‟s six separate assessment procedures that identify: a project‟s 
economic and social efforts; financing of the project; creating and certifying CERs 












performance; and the distribution of development benefits from the project (Toman; 
2001, 216). 
 
As of March 2011, the CDM Executive Board had registered 2,867 projects that are 
projected to accumulate CERs of an equivalence to 798 million tons of CO2 per year. 
(Fay et al.; 2011, 1). These projects are important in the global environmental 
governance architecture because they actively bridge the gap between developed and 
developing nations as participants in environmental governance. They are designed 
under the consciousness that any global environmental policy that does not include 
developing countries will not be sufficient as a means to mitigate climate change, as 
well as alleviate wasteful resources consumption. Therefore, the CDM is interpreted 
as a cost effective way to transfer wealth to developing countries by incorporating 
clean development into environmental policy. It is believed that the CDM can be 
utilized to decrease emerging economies‟ rapidly growing appetites for 
environmentally destructive behaviour, notably in India, China and Brazil. Article 12, 
paragraph 2 of the of the Kyoto Protocol identifies the aims of the CDM; 
 
1) To assist non-Annex 1 countries in achieving sustainable development. 
To assist non-Annex 1 countries in contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC,described in article 2 as stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in 
a sustainable manner, thereby reducing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere to  
1- to assist Annex 1 countries in achieving compliance with their quantified 
emissions limitations and reduction commitments under Article 3 of the 
Protocol (UNFCCC article 12) . 
 
Players in the Carbon Markets  
 
Within the carbon markets there are three main types of actors; the compliance 
players, offset implementers, and their financial intermediaries. The compliance 












restrictions, or to exercise their market options to stay within the rules of cap and 
trade. Under the EU ETS, due to the size of some of the major industrial firms, credit 
allocation to compliance players is relatively concentrated. For instance, 33 percent of 
the total permits in Europe are distributed to the 10 largest emitters. RWE, a German 
electric utility company, receives 6 percent of total EU permits (Ellerman, Convery 
and De Perthuis; 2010, 127). The financial intermediaries are not directly involved in 
emissions restrictions in the same manner of operational policy as the compliance 
players. Rather, they seek profit in carbon pricing as a facilitator between different 
compliance actors to help firms mitigate risk in the carbon markets. Intermediaries 
accumulate profits in the carbon markets by providing carbon financial services, such 
as derivate packages, futures, swaps, and options for industrial players, as well as 
financing emissions offsetting projects. Their appeal to the carbon markets is clearly 
the large earning potential; the carbon markets have become a $ 300 billion industry 
with major financial institutions like Barclays, Goldman Sachs and Citibank holding 
carbon trading exchanges in Wall Street and London as speculation towards the future 
of the carbon markets estimate a growth potential of $2-3 trillion within the next 
decade (Shapiro; 2010, 31). The offset portion of carbon finance is run by firms 
looking to capitalize off of the carbon markets by implementing projects that reduce 
emissions instead of a „business as usual‟ scenario, operating under Kyoto‟s CDM 
and Joint Implementation (JI) as well as a substantially smaller platform in the 
voluntary market, which is outside of the scope of either the UNFCCC or the EU 
ETS, and is subjected to even less regulation.  
 
Chapter four has described the current structure of the carbon markets, showing that 
they have been a well thought out process, with multiple important players given 
decisive roles to create a market system for emissions reductions. But tying this 
information in with previous chapters it is understood why the carbon markets have 
not had the success that was initially anticipated. The markets were designed as a way 
to include the developing world in emissions reductions, anticipating that it is more 
advantageous to the global economy to offset emissions in developing countries by 
re-routing western fund to the South, paying for these energy related development 
projects. Basically, instead of placing the entire burden on Western countries‟ 
industrial sector at a more expensive cost, industry is given the option to diversify 












transfer from North to South and encourage sustainable development, while 
simultaneously reducing „business as usual‟ emissions.  However, as much 
importance the current system has given to developing countries, they have not been 
treated as decision making equals. The following chapters of this paper will look at 
how these decision makers behave in the carbon markets within the current policy 
designs with a particular focus on the developing world, whose role in environmental 
governance has been fiercely debated. Additionally, the following chapters will 
include some theoretical explanations for these problems, which are important for 
finding a solution and developing environmental policy, advancing the central 
argument in this thesis that the carbon markets cannot be open to manipulation 
through lax regulation, but also must retain a certain amount of flexibility to appease 































Chapter 5- Legitimacy in Environmental Governance  
 
In the scholarship on global environmental governance increased legitimacy has 
become a primary focus for the success of environmental reforms. Various critiques 
of the current public and private governing mechanisms have called to attention 
legitimacy shortfalls that must be remedied. In global governance, legitimacy can be 
conceived of in a variety of ways. Predominately, organizational legitimacy will 
materialize when an organization or regime can justify its existence because its 
activities are congruent to the social values deemed acceptable in the larger social 
system that they operate within (Dowling and Pfeffer; 1975, 122). Conversely, a 
regime is void of legitimacy if it does not operate in a decent, consistent manner, 
functioning for the greater good. An umbrella definition of legitimacy, as illustrated 
by Suchman, is when the “actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions‟ 
(Suchman; 1995, 574). To ascribe legitimacy to climate governance in accordance to 
Suchman‟s generalized definition, a climate regime must operate under a number of 
fundamental principles. From a normative perspective, environmental governance 
will accomplish legitimacy if, among other factors, it is democratic in nature, and 
whereby legitimacy is retained when the will of the people is conveyed through the 
actions of a regime in a manner inclusive of transparency and accountability 
(Lövbrand, Rindefjäll and Nordqvist ; 2009, 77).  Here democracy is recognized in the 
sense of stakeholder democracy, where the wants of society are transplanted onto national and 
global policy agenda‟s. This includes government accountability and representation that 
reflects the general desires of the people in environmental reforms.   
 
Although a democratic deficit will, without doubt, occur in the decision-making 
process of transnational regimes due to the lack of direct participation from global 
citizens, democratic legitimacy can be established when the regime expresses the 
perceived will of the people. Manifesting when it is generally accepted that the 
regime‟s mandate, and how they operationalize their mandate, will bring 
environmentally progressive behaviour and, in turn, function to retain our quality of 
life in our interactions with the ecosystem for future generations. Although it is 
perceived  that developing countries have much less concerned for problems that may 












problems they face today, it is clear that increased information is changing these 
opinions and demands for long term sustainable development are becoming more 
prevalent.  Sustainable development includes production and agricultural processes 
that are designed to have low environmental impacts, while simultaneously, being 
more resilient to external factors. Incidences such as high drought and natural 
disasters have encouraged developing countries to pursue more dynamic/sustainable 
farming practices. Also, energy shortages and lack of energy security has hindered 
manufacturing capacities in developing countries, resulting in citizens and 
governments alike insisting that home grown renewable energy must be pursued. 
These are examples of developing nations appetite for a development policy paradigm 
shift towards more sustainable development solutions. Solutions that the CDM and 
EU ETS have been designed to provide.  
 
Good democratic governance can be interpreted when looking at a stakeholder model 
rather than the traditional state-centric notions of democratic participation. The 
stakeholder concept brings forth the idea of proper governance without a unified 
government, where participation at the transnational level occurs when the various 
stakeholders, businesses, NGO‟s, civil society and governments, are given influence 
on the policy in a consistent manner of transparency and accountability (Bernstein; 
2005, 147), differing from a traditional sense of democracy where an electoral system 




To achieve increased legitimacy in climate governance it is apparent to the author that 
four additional fundamental principles must be further accomplished; equality, 
efficiency, sustainability and positive environmental outcomes. Equality transpires 
when the regime operates in a manner whereby polluters pay proportionately 
according to the environmental destruction they are causing or have caused in the 
past. Different states and industries within those states will have varying negative 
effects on the environment, and also have different means of counterbalancing their 
actions. When actors are held responsible for their actions, through legally binding 
mechanisms, the principle of equality is attained. The remaining criteria necessary to 












environmental outcomes, which can all be considered interrelated. A climate regime 
must be long-lasting, proving that it has in its ability staying power for multiple 
generations, as well as providing quantifiable proof that it is, in fact, positively 
contributing to the mitigation of climate change. Furthermore, this must be done with 
efficient practices that do not accompany undesirable costs resulting in the 
disintegration of public support.  
 
The Kyoto regime is lacking in these fundamental principles. Currently, the 
legitimacy of the Kyoto regime is fractured, with equality between states acting as the 
largest impediment to the growth of the regime. However, as states come closer to 
terms with how responsibility for reforms can be administered, as we have witnessed 
in the 2011 Durban Conference of the Parties, this gap is closing, with nation states 
providing more conciliatory rhetoric; at the very least agreeing to agree on legally 
binding emissions reduction by the year 2020. Arguably, Kyoto does fit into the 
concept of a non-electoral, non-territorial stakeholder democracy due to its inclusion 
of various participants outside the fora of nation-states. The UN climate change 
conventions include a large number of parallel events and exhibits held by civil 
society groups and business organizations which, are allocated a certain degree of 
influence on decision making. However, this influence is relatively small and the final 
decisions largely reflect the interests of the most powerful states. Where Kyoto does 
gain points for legitimacy is in the design of the policy as a market-led initiative that 
has the ability to become a cost efficient means to pursue emissions reductions. 
However, the extent to which the free-market is given free reign in climate policy 
could reduce long-term success. The following pages delve into the issue areas where 
the Kyoto regime is susceptible to loss of legitimacy, including; the sustainability and 
effectiveness of the current carbon market structure and the self-governance the free-
market is allocated within the policy framework.   
 
The Commoditization of Carbon and the Underlying Difficulties   
 
With new-found value tied up in carbon emissions, „brokers, consultants, carbon 
procurement funds, hedge fund managers and other buyers have scoured the globe for 












developing countries‟ (Capoor and Ambrosi; 2006, ii). All of these players are in 
search of carbon reductions that they can capitalize on due to the nature of such 
reductions; found in the developing world where economies generally operate with 
less efficiency and therefore providing much more investment opportunities and 
higher available reduction margins than in the more efficient industrialized nations. 
Also, there are many projects, such as reforestation and carbon sequestering, which 
are accepted as reducers of emissions under the CDM, and which yield large amounts 
of CER credits with proportionally less investment than domestic reduction plans in 
the industrialized states. For these opportunities to be utilized to generate profit in the 
marketplace, carbon reductions, or offsetting, to use the CDM terminology, must be 
treated as a tradable commodity where value is attached to carbon reduction credits 
that can be quantified, owned, and traded on the carbon markets (Bumpus and 
Liverman; 2008, 134). The commoditization of carbon is taking place due to the 
inputs of politics, economics and science with the three having a tendency to be 
uncooperative with one another in regards to climate change, but all are essential for 
the commoditization process of carbon emissions. Neil Smith illustrates this point by 
stating that, „the power of bundling up nature into tradable bits of capital should not 
be underestimated, but nor should it be exaggerated. The neo-liberalization of nature 
is far from complete, not without its obstacles, and is anything but a smooth process„ 
(Smith; 2007, 21).  This point further illustrates the difficulty of the stakeholder 
democracy model for environmental governance with different regimes pulling policy 
in different directions. These stakeholders all have a large degree of power in the 
realm of environmental governance and must cooperate with one another for effective 
policy to be implemented. Instead, it is often found that they are at odds with one 
another in attempts to pursue their own prerogatives.  Examples include politicians 
ignoring or denouncing climate change scientist so that the issue can be sidestepped 
or framed inside of their own agenda, or economists insisted on certain climate 
change policies that do not respect the political workings of nation stakes, and are 
therefore unachievable.   
 
Any form of GHG management, through either command and control (earlier defined 
as strict highly structured government-led emissions controls) or market mechanisms 
will present the opportunity for some producers to obtain an advantage over others. 












can limit their output, resulting in the ability of firms to raise the prices for future 
outputs above the current competitive level, seeking comparative rents for less 
production. These higher production costs will be redistributed throughout the entire 
economy, providing for producers rents by avoiding the inefficiencies of existing 
taxes and labour (Smith; 2008, 8). Secondly, firms that have low abatement costs but 
receive a large amount of permits in the permit allocation process are able to use these 
low abatement costs as a comparative advantage against firms that have higher 
abatement costs. Essentially, increasing their profits by selling off free permits that 
they did not need in the first place.  However, both of these scenarios can be avoided 
through a number of industry specific adjustments. For example, producer rents can 
be reduced by favouring certain industries (providing less expensive permits) with 
extremely high abatement costs that would otherwise leave them unable to adjust or 
expand production. Although it is important that allocation mechanisms do not further 
distort carbon prices when the value (cost) of permits are passed on to consumers, 
even when the producers receive the permits at low costs. This is explained because 
producers value these permits, not necessarily in light of how much they paid for 
them, but in what they can receive upon their sale if they are not subjected to their 
use, or retirement, after production. An illustration of why giving permits away for 
free, termed „grandfathering‟,  should be avoided.  
 
Carbon Finance: Susceptible to Manipulation  
 
Essentially, a large aspect of how the carbon financial markets work is likened to 
trading in derivatives with promises to turn over reduction/offset or unused credits in 
a specified quantity, at a certain price, by a specific date (Chan; 2009, 6). Paralleling a 
derivative, carbon is sold on the market in futures or forward contracts with a non-
standardized contract written by the parties themselves; industry, investors and project 
developers. In the Kyoto process the underlying benchmark or value that carbon 
assumes is in accordance to the supply and demand of emissions reduction credits. 
Supply is generated by reduction projects and their ability to accrue CER credits, as 
well as initial permit allocation to states and industry. Permits can be auctioned off, 
establishing a benchmark price for carbon upon sale, or can be distributed free of 












Social Cost, it is understood that it does not matter whether or not a benchmark 
carbon price is established in the onset of permit allocation, having no effect on the 
supply and demand of emissions permits. Coase demonstrates that free allocation of 
permits will not restrict the trade of permits and that trade will continue until the price 
of the permit becomes equal to its costs (the cost of not having the number of permits 
to cover all emissions released), but only under conditions of high information 
exchange and low transaction costs (Coarse; 1960, 4-19). Demand is two-tiered; 
partially fixed through political negotiations that set limits to carbon emissions by 
distributing the rights to generate those emissions and, secondly, in the economic 
capacity for growth in countries that have carbon emissions‟ regulations, which are 
more cost effectively met through reductions elsewhere.   
 
The underlying issue with how the carbon markets will perform is in the speculative 
nature of growing derivative markets that have not gained proportionate stability to 
size. Owing to the high-risk nature involved, these markets may prove collapsible 
under pressure. Inevitably, any risk mitigation will surely be undertaken at the 
expense of the environment by project developers making sure that they can register 
CERs, even though, in reality, positive environmental outcomes from reduction 
projects could be negligent. Such actions are designed to appease investors and 
attempt to illustrate institutional success, but instead are highly counterproductive 
when discovered, severely reducing the legitimacy of cap and trade.  
 
Worrisome in the CDM framework is the creation of „sub-prime credits‟ or „sub-
prime carbon contracts‟ that carry with them an extremely high risk of collapsing in 
value due to the chance that they will not generate verifiable carbon reductions. These 
„shoddy‟ credits threaten the functionality of the entire system when they are traded 
alongside the distributed emissions allowances that are allocated by governments 
(Chan; 2009, 7). As a result, „real‟ emissions reductions are mixed in with „fake‟ ones 
that are tradable and re-tradable with one another, even before the projects that are 
forecasted to accumulate reductions have produced any results. Hence, the term „sub-
prime credits‟ exists due to the difficulty in verifying certain mechanisms that claim 
to create emissions reductions but may very well fall short. These include, among 














If there is one thing that the 2008 global financial crisis has taught us it is that large-
scale finance needs to be regulated. When dealing in billions of dollars there will 
always be the incentive for large financial institutions to establish a system whereby 
they can invent money to accumulate greater profits, as was the case in the US 
banking system when major players were allowed to manipulate derivate and 
securities markets, sacrificing the stability of the entire system for private gain at the 
expense of the public. The carbon markets are equally susceptible to the ambitions of 
global financiers and therefore need to be monitored not only from on-site, where 
carbon credits are being verified, but from the holdings and investment houses in 
Wall Street and London. Schemes to „invent money‟ in the carbon markets are plenty, 
and in their current infancy stage, the carbon markets have proven to be susceptible to 
unscrupulous manipulation.   
 
The most often practiced of such schemes is called „boosting the baselines‟, which 
occurs on both the industry side of carbon trading and the offset developer‟s side 
(Chan; 2010, 2). On the offset project developer side, a baseline is the amount of 
GHG emissions that would have been released in the absence of the particular project. 
On the industry side, a baseline is what you are currently emitting in GHGs. Baselines 
are used to determine how many credits will be allocated to industrial players or 
where the starting point of a reduction project begins. Industrial players will inflate 
their emissions projections to be allocated a greater portion of carbon permits and 
then sell off these permits later when it is „realized‟ that they do not actually emit as 
much as they had stated. Developers seeking offset credits will claim that a project 
has eliminated a certain number of emissions reflecting the inflated baseline to gain a 
larger amount of emissions reduction credits to be sold off, referred to as their margin 
of additionality. This severely decreases the integrity of the system, as it is obvious 
that such practice results in the false reporting of global emissions reductions. 
 
Another major obstacle in sustaining legitimacy in the carbon markets is evident in 
the amount of political persuasion that big business has over the system. The largest 
emitters are known to lobby for their own benefit in regard to environmental policy, 
rather than encourage productive environmental reforms in an attempt to track larger 












reduction credits that they can trade on the market, or use to produce increased 
emissions themselves for doing virtually nothing, or incorporating „environmentally 
friendly‟ practices that they should be doing anyway, independent of climate regimes 
like Kyoto that reward them for doing so. An example of such manipulation of the 
system is found in the „emissions reductions‟ made by British Petroleum (BP). 
Lobbying through the firm Environmental Defense, BP was able to set up a carbon 
trading scheme that allowed them to easily make their 10 percent reduction 
requirement, plus a profit, through excess reductions by simply putting a halt to the 
unnecessary flaring of gas (Mackenzie; 2007 8,). Such practice should not be 
rewarded under the Kyoto mechanisms, and thus point out an ever-familiar problem 
of large business‟ ability to set the GHG emissions reduction agenda to suit their own 
needs and is, identical to the circumstances that economists have called „moral 
hazard‟. Moral hazard is an incentive to claim that you would have done something 
that increases GHG emissions, but are choosing not to for the betterment of the 
environment, which conveniently accompanies financial restitution. For example, 
carbon credits have been awarded to organizations for „avoided deforestation‟ which 
is when an organization decides not to cut down a forest, but claim that they would 
have otherwise done so if there were not an incentive to leave the trees in the ground 
(Paterson; 2010, 10). 
 
Carbon offsetting projects are also highly susceptible to bribery and manipulation. 
Under the CDM, the host nations situated in the developing world, where bribery is 
most prevalent, are given a large degree of responsibility in choosing which projects 
will get off the ground, instituting host nation controls over which projects are 
accepted under the CDM and which ones are not. Although it can be positively looked 
upon that developing countries are able to make the final decision in which projects 
are best suited to them, there are negative consequences. There are concerns that less 
developed countries are highly susceptible to the manipulation of private actors, and 
may be willing to allow loose standards for emissions reduction verification. The least 
developed nations are in fierce competition for the foreign direct investment (FDI) 
that accompanies emissions reduction projects. Therefore, incentive towards 
sidestepping meaningful, sustainable development mechanisms in exchange for short-
term financial rewards is great, ultimately creating a „race to the bottom‟ by Annex-1 












low abatement costs, irrelevant of sustainable development achievements (Sutter and 
Parreno; 2007, 76). 
 
A host nation‟s Designated National Authority (DNA) can easily be paid off to give 
the go-ahead on a bad project over a good one, thereby establishing projects that have 
little climate benefit and, on the surface, claim to be creating emissions reductions. 
Another CDM authority, the Designated Operational Entity (DOE), is also given a 
great deal of power as the external project validator. The DOE, usually a profit-
seeking risk-management firm hired by project developers as project auditors, assess 
the amount of carbon credits a project will accumulate. As a result of including profit 
driven institutions in the validation process, the CDM is susceptible to inaccurate and 
non-transparent reports that can basically be bought from „expert‟ validators. On 
numerous occasions, DOEs have been accused of „fudging results‟ to procure further 
contracts from project developers (Lövbrand, Rindefjäll and Nordqvist; 2009, 83-87, 
Cabello; 2009, 195 and Paulson; 2009, 66). 
 
To a very large degree the integrity of the CDM market depends on the conduct of the 
in-country DNA and the DOE external validators. What could be expected if it is 
realized that too many carbon emissions reductions initiatives have been falsified is 
the price of carbon might plummet, as we have seen in the past when it was realized 
that the EU had allocated more carbon credits than was needed and demand was over-
estimated (Business Week; 2007). The bursting of a carbon bubble of un-orderly 
wealth creation is a very probable event if the market is not designed to deter the 
aforementioned types of activity. Given that cap and trade has, in the last decade, 
grown at such an exponential rate, it is best to adopt the appropriate policies that will 
iron out these issues sooner rather than later before the system loses the necessary 
credibility for it to operate on a political front. Any market collapse at a later stage 
would have dire effects, not only on the economy at large, but also on the future of 
















Carbon Trading for Emerging Economies and Least Developed Nations  
 
As a „for-profit mechanism‟, the CDM has a tendency to gravitate towards projects in 
which the easiest reduction credits can be pursued, and which may be 
counterproductive to the CDM mandate of encouraging sustainable development. The 
tendency of project developers towards picking the lowest hanging fruit is occurring 
both in least and less developed countries. Examples of such are the types of projects 
that are being implemented in the more developed non-Annex 1 countries that would 
have most likely occurred without the CDM. In China there have been more than two 
hundred large-sale hydro electricity plants registered for CER credits, even though 
these plants had been under construction before it was realized that they could be 
incorporated into the CDM. (Cabello; 2009,195).   
 
The redistribution of FDI flows towards the least developed nations is supposed to be 
one of the key tenets of the CDM framework. Howev r, the weakest states are not 
major beneficiaries of increased FDI flows catalyzed by the CDM. Instead, emerging 
economies China, India and Brazil have gained the lion‟s share of FDI flows; nations 
that have large levels of production and thus greater industrial emissions reduction 
capabilities in existing production processes. CDM inspired FDI has targeted dirty 
production methods, making them „cleaner‟; a desirable exercise, but not entirely 
fulfilling the mandate of the CDM for sustainable development. These types of 
emissions reductions, for example reducing the flaring of gas or attaching to industry 
varying emissions filtrations and carbon storage processes, do not provide socio-
economic benefits to impoverished communities. The high concentration of like 
projects in these three countries confines the available opportunities for poorest 
nations to harness the capital redistribution power of the CDM, notably countries of 
Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Nussbaumer; 2009, 92). 
 
What makes the CDM so attractive to African states is its fast-track ambitions to 
alleviate poverty through sustainable development that is funded by Western nations. 
However, current institutional and infrastructural shortcomings make emissions 
reduction projects in Africa less desirable for investors. Investors will associate more 












amount of pressure on developers to accrue more credits with less investment, which 
can have negative results on a CDM project‟s ability to make environmental progress 
and provide public goods.   
 
What is important for Africa is less of a reliance on Western initiative to spark these 
development projects. As of late, we have seen an increased amount of success in 
home-grown ingenuity funded by Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), set up to 
encourage the implementation of the CDM in Africa through domestic 
entrepreneurship and innovation; a crucial factor in Africa‟s goals in poverty 
alleviation (Gantsho and Karani; 2007, 335). DFIs, through their many products and 
services, are most suitable to CDM projects by making available development 
banking and development assistance, by providing lending and investment guarantees 
(Karani; 2002, 87).  If DFIs can effectively stifle innovation to increase larger 
amounts of CERs from African projects, then the potential for Africa under the CDM 
is immense.  When Africa can utilize DFIs simultaneously with the CDM to provide  
clean energy, better agricultural practices and forestry and soil conservation 
techniques as instruments to increase productivity, African growth can surely be 
realized.  The importance of this reciprocal relationship between DFIs and home-
grown innovation is highlighted in the pages of The Economist; ‟The emerging world 
will undoubtedly make a growing contribution to breakthrough innovations. People 
who used to think of the emerging world as a source of cheap labor must now 
recognize that it can be a source of disruptive innovation as well. The world‟s creative 
energy is shifting to the developing countries, which are becoming innovators in their 
own right rather than just talented imitators. A growing number of the world‟s 
business innovations will in the future come not from the “West” but from the 
“rest”.‟(Economist; 2010).  
 
Public Leadership in Climate Governance  
 
Ongoing debate over how to appropriately address the climate change dilemma 
involves, at opposite ends of the spectrum, arguments for strictly economic as well as 
strictly political solutions. Both camps have been accused of outrageously narrow-












occupy. There are those that argue that climate change is a problem that governance 
can fix with tight pollution controls, pursuing hyper-green initiatives that clearly lack 
a sufficient grasp of global economics, such as activists on the streets outside of 
international governing conventions like the G20, or the particular summit of the day. 
On the other side of the spectrum you will find attitudes towards climate change 
similar to that of Vaclav Klaus, economist and current president of the Czech 
Republic. Klaus has declared that, to tackle climate change, a full free-market 
approach without the need for political guidance in the form of regulation is best. 
Like-minded individuals envision that markets have the ability to „free initiatives, 
regulate the scarcity of resources and, in the long run, stimulate the innovations that 
will provide the solutions to humanity‟s problems‟ (Callon; 2009, 535). However, 
such an approach does not address the inequalities that free-markets are powerless to 
avoid; that markets alone do not have a great track record in providing public goods 
(Callon; 2009, 536). 
 
Sir Nicholas Stern contends that the unforeseeable externalities, unavoidable in free-
market capitalism, are the root causes of the climate change predicament that we now 
face (Stern; 2006, 3). The externalities in question are the effects that large-scale 
economic growth has had on our planet. Stern illustrates that scientific achievements 
have made the issue of climate change relevant when existing neo-liberal markets 
would have only served to exasperate global warming without the ability to adjust to 
these externalities in an appropriate time frame. Therefore, the incidence of climate 
change can be interpreted as hazardous to the accumulation of capital, but fortunately, 
can be mitigated through profit driven mechanisms (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, 
131). The threat to capital that comes with environmental change is evident in 
decreased environmental stability that is currently underway with a greater occurrence 
of earthquakes and floods, for example, and the general atmosphere of uncertainty 
that accompanies climate change. The opportunity for varying forms of profit resides 
in the mitigation of these risks through change in the production processes including 
the various carbon reduction schemes. Conventional economics explains this profit-
seeking response to climate change as introducing innovative responses that allow for 
a comparative advantage in responding to global concerns and demands for a greener 













Accepting that a market-led approach is the best avenue for climate change action, it 
must be established that the driving forces behind this approach, i.e: governments that 
create value in carbon offsets and reduction by establishing emissions taxes or quotas, 
must continue to play an integral role in the functioning of the system. Good 
governance in carbon offsetting under the CDM, as well as the carbon markets as a 
whole, is important for a plethora of reasons. Under the CDM, the main concern 
involves ethical reasons that limit development potential and climate offset 
accounting fraud. The gravitation towards illicit behavior is caused by potential 
profits that accompany attaching flexible climate change initiatives to the global 
capitalist economy. Large financial institutions will take the shortest road to profits 
available, which is why good governance needs to step in to ensure that any avenue to 
a profit must be in concordance with the overall mission of combating climate 
change. There must be unified international requirements for a robust, transparent 
system where public and private actors work together to guarantee and support carbon 
disclosure and emission allowance reporting, and meet the overall objective of carbon 
markets to efficiently and effectively reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions 
(Lovell; 2010, 353). 
 
Establishing the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent EU ETS left 
some very large holes in how carbon trading was meant to function. The governing of 
the carbon markets became a highly contested issue, so it was for the most part looked 
at as a market-led experiment, and perceived that governance structures would be 
institutionalized on a need-be bases. Whether these forms of governance were to be 
created through international policies or by the market alone, it was left undecided. 
Kyoto simply gained international consensus that a carbon market was the most 
practical way to lower emissions levels, but left the cap and trade system to function 
on its own, setting up no more than a bare framework of a market, with little detail on 

















Chapter 6- Theory: Legitimacy vs. Accumulation  
 
Theoretical Underpinnings: Critical Social Theory  
 
To effectively examine the tension of accumulation and legitimacy in the carbon 
markets one can turn to Karl Polanyi‟s „double movement‟ (Polanyi; 1944). In 
Polanyi‟s seminal work, The Great Transformation, two conflicting forces shape a 
double movement; the first being the efforts of capitalist institutions moving towards 
great expansion of laissez-faire and the self-regulating markets; the opposing 
movement is the initiatives of various social actors who are attempting to insulate 
society from the „destructive impacts of market pressures‟ (Block; 2008, 1). The 
emergence of a double movement has been especially present since the 1980s when 
neo-liberalism became the focus of western policy-makers generating market 
fundamentalism and the Washington consensus, subsequently inspiring a large 
counter movement against these powerful forces as it became clear that regulatory 
apparatuses must be put in place to avoid destructive social, environmental, and 
economic consequences (Evans; 2008, 273). 
 
Polanyi‟s postulation is that the market system cannot exist independently of 
governments which must dictate how much power is given to actors on both sides of 
the double movement, and, ultimately, governments allocate power to the various 
actors in the clash between accumulation and legitimacy. He insists that the exercise 
of state power will determine the playing field for this confrontation (Block; 2008). 
When there is no such exercise of power in an all-consuming free-market and 
conditions are created that ensure the „market is the only organizing power in the 
economic sphere‟, results can be „disastrous‟ (Polanyi; 2001, 72). Polanyi‟s 
contention is that a truly free-market is especially unsustainable when commodities 
that are not actually produced for sale in the market place operate under the same 
capitalist or „market society‟ principles as those that are. These commodities are 
destructive because the market cannot identify their demise in a timely manner, and 
instead, society is best suited to provide such information acting as a legitimizing 













Polanyi uses the terminology „fictitious commodities‟ to describe key elements of the 
world economy that cannot alone be produced by the market, namely; land, labor and 
money. These are commodities that the state must become involved in by managing 
the supply and demand to ensure that sustainable quantities are made available as they 
are vital to the production process (Block; 2003, 21). Although they are not vital to 
the production process, for now that is, it is conceivable that long-term emissions 
control could be one of the most important aspects of the production process. There 
are parallels between the commoditization of carbon and Polanyi's fictitious 
commodities. For one, the existence of carbon as a tradable commodity with attached 
value is only conceivable through the actions of states, responsive to environmental 
concerns that invoke public policy such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Air Act 
in the USA, amongst other emerging carbon trading policies. Without the recent 
establishment of international consensus that something must be done to fight climate 
change, the commoditization of carbon is unimaginable. Also, the supply and demand 
of carbon can only be monitored by governments. This is because of the linear 
relationship between science, society‟s perceptions that there must some sort of 
intervention in the world economy that mitigates climate change, and governmental 
decisions to implement policy that targets carbon emissions. Hence, the supply and 
demand must be controlled by the government dictating informed societal goals onto 
the market. The market must then respond to these ambitions for the entire system to 
operate properly, in the end leaving the market susceptible to the actions of 
government.  
 
Legitimacy vs. Accumulation  
 
Polanyi's double movement is apparent in the carbon markets with ongoing tension 
between accumulation (free-market) and legitimacy (societal pressures). While the 
system seeks legitimacy to stabilize the markets, the mechanisms of the industry- 
emissions trading, offset markets, reporting and disclosure, are all responsive to 
profit-seeking private governance structures. The legitimacy vs. accumulation dual 
will always be present with initiatives that need credibility to operate, but also need to 
track large profits to keep afloat. What is necessary is to establish that the legitimacy 












willing to compromise the initial objective for increased profits. Such a move would 
surely pull the societal support out from under the system. Therefore, it is important 
that the scope of private governance is limited. Instead, international organizations, 
for example the UN and EU who have outlined the framework for carbon governance, 
take a more active role and become an impartial force in this arena. However, a 
counter argument can be made that an attempt to over-regulate the carbon markets 
through political processes, like setting up institutions to impartially monitor 
offsetting projects and carbon finance that incorporate stale bureaucracy, can be 
counterproductive to the success of the emissions reduction system, and carbon 
finance will lose its attractiveness to investors, limiting the potential efficiency of the 
system (Paterson; 2010, 15). A notable argument, however, given the great deal of 
capital exchange involved in these growing markets, is that surely finances can be put 
aside to fund carbon change observers without retracting a great deal of the intended 
cost effectiveness of cap and trade. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the entire 
system be regulated and monitored by public officials, thereby eliminating the private 
regulators, but that public officials are in control of the regulation processes in a 
hierarchal manner with private operators in subordinate roles.    
 
Accumulation and legitimacy should not be made to function as two opposing poles, 
but rather with the same aim in which proper governance structures assert that 
accumulation is impossible without incorporating legitimacy.  This would result in 
providing financial rewards only for effective initiatives, rather than for the current 
system, which provides incentives to get into carbon finance without necessarily 
providing environmental benefits. Bernstein succinctly illustrates the current tension 
between legitimacy and accumulation in the political economy of environmentalism, 
when stating „the contemporary legitimacy challenge‟, stems, in part, from the very 
success of liberal environmentalism when governing arrangements have gone too far 
towards elevating the normative status of markets, thus, in effect, subordinating 
environmental purposes to economic goals, even within ostensibly environmental 
institutions (Bernstein; 2005, 164). Consequently, it is important that a proper 
equilibrium is managed between private and public governance without the former 
being able to free itself from social and political constraints. The carbon markets must 
be adapted to retain the necessary amount of efficiency, as well as the support that it 












emissions reductions, and most importantly, produce results.   
 
In the works of Antonio Gramsci, the concept of hegemony is used to recognize the 
influence of societal groupings on rules, norms and policies to systematically benefit 
certain groups by maintaining economic and social structures (Levy and Newell; 
2002, 87, Levy and Egan; 2003, 824). Gramsci uses hegemony to describe; „not only 
a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity . . . the 
development and expansion of the group are conceived of, and presented, as being the 
motor force of a universal expansion…..the dominant group is coordinated concretely 
with the general interests of the subordinate groups‟ (Gramsci; 1971, 181). Here civil 
society is structured to preserve the hegemonic stability of the economic and political 
order by aligning general interests with those of the elite, but ensuring that the 
interests of the elite prevail within the system.   
 
By applying a neo-Gramscian perspective to understanding environmental 
governance, it can be said that hegemony exits as a structural safeguard for political 
and economic stability. Those in dominant roles in society will respond to public 
concerns for the environment by giving the impression that certain reforms are 
targeted to increase environmental sustainability when, in fact, they are actually 
functioning to also fulfill, simultaneously, completely separate goals. Actors who 
control these economic and political structures will amend the political and economic 
relationships with the environment, but will not do so in a way that is likely to 
threaten the current order, in effect, remaining, in a hierarchical sense, on top by 
maintaining hegemony over environmental governance with the appearance that 
specific reforms are solely environmental efforts. As a result of this façade, firms and 
political actors are able to project that they are legitimate actors in environmental 
governance, when they may be pursuing goals that are not principally environmental, 


















Conclusion: Regulating the Carbon Markets  
 
One answer to the aforementioned difficulty in the carbon markets of accumulation 
vs. legitimacy is increased regulatory reforms. Regulating the carbon markets by way 
of government intervention is attractive because the carbon markets are very much 
still in their infancy. Regulation would help to protect the capital investments in new 
markets, following the same logic that argues for state-led interventions in other 
privatizations and commodifications where the commodity in question is a political 
construct, and thus reliant on good governance for market stability.  
 
Reforms in the offset markets are first and foremost necessary to improve 
methodologies for accurately determining and quantifying emissions reductions. Such 
reforms will go a long way towards preventing gaming and fraud. In doing so it is 
important to observe which CDM activities and their prescribed emissions reduction 
accounting methodologies can be fixed, scrapped, or remain unchanged. Given that 
the CDM encompasses such a wide scope of activities that reduce, avoid or sequester 
GHGs, it is conceivable that some of these existing methodologies are simply not 
suitable as a part of the CDM.   
 
There have been numerous CDM projects that accumulate „smoke stack‟ credits by 
simply altering or filtering pollution that is generated by already profitable industries. 
Most of these projects have taken place in more developed countries like China and 
India, and result in claims to offset emissions in numbers that are extremely difficult 
to verify (Financial Times; 2007). Furthermore, these projects do not at all fulfill the 
developmental criteria of the CDM, in reality only benefiting already wealthy factory 
owners and carbon market players. In contrast to the „smoke stack‟ credits, there are 
many CDM methodologies that have easily quantifiable emissions offsets, as well as 
developmental benefits, notably, efficient cook-stove projects that are becoming 
popular with a great deal of success throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. These projects, 
by way of a simple explanation, are designed to catalyze a fuel switch in the domestic 
setting from a carbon intensive to a less carbon environmentally destructive fuel 
source, (i.e. charcoal to wood) or reduce the amount of fuel that is being burned by 












CERs bring to such projects, the high tech stoves and socio-economic benefits that 
they accompany are not foreseeable. Efficient cook-stove projects not only fulfill the 
emission reduction criteria of the CDM by reducing deforestation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a considerable problem, where over one half of the deforestation is directly 
caused by the demand in cooking fuels, but fulfil the developmental criteria as well. 
They allow for women reduced cooking and fuel gathering time, lowered household 
energy costs, as well as health benefits in reduced smoke inhalation. The comparison 
of these two CDM project types illustrates that the CDM can be a successful venture 
if properly applied. Although it may have seemed like a good idea to build an 
ambitious all-inclusive offsetting mechanism, simply put, certain types of projects are 
just not adaptable as part of the CDM.  
 
The CDM Executive Board (EB) is also in need of some alterations aimed at 
achieving tighter regulation in the offset markets. The EB and its staff are responsible 
for supervising the entire system from an overly top down perspective. Paulson 
suggests that the CDM Executive Board take on a more direct role in projects by 
applying CDM transaction costs to the validation process (Paulson; 2009, 5). Instead 
of letting profit-seeking firms into the validation process, the EB should include under 
its control a centralized entity that more strictly follows the CER verification 
standards. Likewise, the EB has the ability to work closely with DNA‟s to prevent 
project manipulation, which would be accomplished through a more open information 
exchange between the EB and project developers. 
 
The EB controls which projects are accepted and is meant to reduce perverse 
incentives for players in the offset markets. However, the UNFCCC Secretariat does 
not give the EB a large leadership or regulatory function, instead leaving these 
important roles, respectively, up to the nation states‟ DNAs and the DOEs that are 
contracted by project developers (Purdy; 2009, 10). The DNA is often inexperienced 
and unqualified in the CDM, and unable to provide the guidance that the stringent 
CDM methodologies require. The DOE is, due to profit seeking and conflict of 
interest, not suitable as a regulatory vehicle. To overcome this downfall the EB could 
increase its relatively meager staff and take on more regulatory and advisory 
responsibilities by employing technical experts that communicate with project 












failing to accumulate CERs and, in turn, disincentivise malpractice in offset project 
development. Considering that the EB currently levies an administration fee of 2 
percent of credits from projects and operates at about a 50 percent annual surplus, the 
expansion of the EB to enforce greater regulation and more fluid information 
exchanges would be welcomed at very little cost  
 
In general carbon finance, including the financial mangers of carbon assets - the 
intermediaries between the buyers and sellers of carbon credits - a number of 
regulatory measures could strengthen the market place. First of all, the risk involved 
in carbon trading must be addressed. Carbon credits, when traded as derivatives, do 
very little to actually reduce this risk as is intended, but instead spread it around and 
hide it; likewise to the securitization of assets that triggered the 2008 financial crisis. 
This redistribution of volatile assets is referred to as „financial contagion‟, whereby a 
number of bad apples (similar to bad mortgages) could eventually bring down the 
entire system if risk is not properly calculated, if calculation of such risk is even 
possible. To tackle this problem the carbon markets could establish benchmark and 
maximum prices that would bring increased investor confidence and reduce 
speculative behavior. In addition, this would reduce the creation of obscure financial 
packages and money-making schemes;  a policy that would be, although politically 
difficult, led by states to prop up the carbon markets when faltering, and rein them in 
when necessary. Such a system would be hybrid in nature, with the benefits of both 
quality and quantity economic instruments; a quota on emissions, but also price 
controls comparable to a carbon tax.  
 
Carbon price ceilings and guarantees would bring welcome predictability to the 
carbon markets for industry and utility companies that need to apply the cost of 
carbon to long-term financial planning of energy intensive ventures. To be successful, 
a hybrid policy instrument should be developed that is cost effective without having 
too high or too low caps that result in excess cost or excess leniency, (Held and 
Hervey; 2009, 13). This can be addressed by creating a regulatory body that oversees 
the carbon markets and re-adjusts these prices as seen fit. If it is argued that this is too 
much control on a commodity, then let‟s look at the OPEC nations and the control 












commodity. Surely a regulatory body that encourages flexibility in the price of carbon 
would be a lot less intrusive than OPEC in the oil markets?   
 
Christian de Perthuis, writing in regards to the EU ETS, demonstrates that an 
independent carbon central bank may be a feasible solution as a regulatory arm in 
carbon finance. In Europe, a CO2 central bank would be established as an 
independent body that reports to the European Council, EU Parliament and European 
Commission, designed to focus on long-term strategy for efficient carbon markets, 
(De Perthuis; 2011, 10). Although De Perthuis only mentions a European solution, 
essentially because Europe holds the most successful experiences in carbon market 
performance, the idea of a central carbon bank could be globally inclusive, 
responding and reporting to a plethora of international organizations, (EU, OPEC, 
UN, etc.). Owing to the centralized manner of such an institution, behaviors like 
transaction fraud, double counting (recycling) credits, and cyber fraud would be more 
successfully avoided. Furthermore, investor confidence could be retained with a 
coordinating body that may act in a similar fashion to monetary markets‟ „lender of 
last resort‟, as a „safety valve‟, suppressing the cost of carbon when soaring prices 
would otherwise result in negative repercussions in the global economy (De Perthuis; 
2011, 10). 
 
Civil regulation can also play a large part in fine tuning the carbon markets. Civil 
regulation will encourage increased transparency in carbon accounting through 
various non-state market driven carbon disclosure mechanisms and certification 
schemes that target certain industries, from a normative perspective outlining the 
standards that corporate governance should follow in their carbon market 
performance (Cormieret al. 2005, 9 and Levy, Kolke and Pinske; 2008, 726). Carbon 
disclosure will allow for civil society to monitor the progress made by certain firms in 
their emissions reduction efforts; a process that will undoubtedly put pressure on 
firms that are not implementing environmentally progressive behavior in reduced 
emissions, or who are refusing to disclose their emission levels, to alter their 
behavior. Firms that are having success in emissions reductions, and those that are 
even able to claim a neutral carbon footprint, can benefit from advertising their 
emissions reduction success. However, we are far from institutionalizing any such 












that loosely monitor the environmental behaviour of firms, but a great deal of 
difficulty still exists in obtaining emissions data to be given to the general public on 
the actual achievements of specific firms. Instead, in communications with the general 
public we see firms boasting about emissions reduction performances when possible, 
but otherwise concealing their conduct.  
 
In conclusion, the idea of carbon cap and trade is highly commendable for its ability 
to become a major factor in addressing a pending climate crisis.  If properly applied 
the carbon markets can be part of a wider reality in environmental economic 
convergence, a holistic interpretation of environmentally progressive behavior. 
Environmental convergence involves all walks of life, making necessary strides 
towards a more sustainable existence by implementing low carbon technologies, 
business and everyday practices that act in accordance with environmental 
conscientiousness. The idea is likened to a „partnership in which governments, 
businesses, moderate environmentalists, and scientists cooperate in the restructuring 
of the capitalist economy along more environmentally defensible lines. (Dryzek; 
1997, 145). Also termed „ecological modernization‟ the concept of economic 
convergence is set out to exemplify modifications that are economically beneficial for 
the long-term, as well as aligned to extended political goals (Giddens; 2009, 70). 
Although the coordination of such goals has proven to be an incredibly onerous task 
under the current international structure of competing regimes, cap and trade can be 
successful as a flexible emissions reduction policy if it is given the time to mature in 
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